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Abstract 
 Professional objectors are attorneys who, on behalf of nonnamed class members, file 
specious objections to class action settlements and threaten to file frivolous appeals of 
district court approvals merely to extract a payoff. Their behavior amounts to a kind of 
lawful extortion. By contrast, counsel may submit legitimate objections and appeal in good 
faith, which is conduct that helps police the settlement process. The policy challenge is to 
suppress extortionate behavior without deterring beneficial conduct. The solutions that have 
been tried or proposed are flawed. We propose amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure that would, in effect, require objectors to post appeal bonds in amounts greater 
than most circuit courts believe are now legally permissible. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 When the plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel agree to settle a 
federal class action, subject to approval of the district court, any 
member of the class may object.1 If the district court approves the 
settlement the objector may appeal. Appeals take time, and time is 
money—class counsel and, often, nonobjecting class members incur 
costs during the pendency of the appeal because attorneys’ fees 
typically are not payable and settlements are not implemented until 
the legal process has run its course. The prospect of financial loss 
?  A. Robert Noll Distinguished Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, 
Dickinson School of Law. 
 **  Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Adjunct 
Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. We thank 
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 1.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1). 
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caused by delay in implementation of a class settlement has given 
rise to a cottage industry of so-called professional objectors: attorneys 
who oppose settlements on behalf of nonnamed class members and 
threaten to file meritless appeals of the final judgment merely to 
extract a payoff.2 Class counsel have a strong incentive to pay them 
to withdraw their appeal and thereby avoid the cost of delay.3 That 
payment represents a kind of tax on class action settlements.4 In a 
 2.  In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-
01998, 2010 WL 3328249, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 24, 2010); see also In re Cathode Ray Tube 
(CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. CV-07-5944-SC, 2012 WL 1319881, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 
2012) (describing as “a ‘professional’ or ‘serial’ objector” an attorney who “routinely 
represents objectors purporting to challenge class action settlements, and does not do so to 
effectuate changes to settlements, but does so for his own personal financial gain”); In re 
Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 09-MD-2036-JLK, 2011 WL 5873389, at *24 n.30 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2011) (observing that the sole purpose of “professional objectors” is “to 
obtain a fee by objecting to whatever aspects of the Settlement they can latch onto” and 
that they “are motivated by things other than a concern for the welfare of the Settlement 
Class”); Trombley v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 08-cv-456-JD, 2011 WL 3740488, at *5 (D.R.I. 
Aug. 24, 2011) (characterizing “professional objectors” as those “who assert meritless 
objections in large class action settlement proceedings to extort fees or other payments”); In 
re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. MDL 08-1999, 2010 
WL 4630846, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2010) (describing “professional objectors” as 
“attorneys who specialize in objecting to large class-action settlements”); Gemelas v. 
Dannon Co., No. 1:08 CV 236, 2010 WL 3703811, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2010) 
(“[Objector] appears to be making a business of objecting to, and appealing, class action 
settlements in order to obtain some financial reward.”); Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. 
America, No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2000) 
(describing class counsel’s characterization of “professional objectors” as “a pariah to the 
functionality of class action lawsuits, as they maraud proposed settlements—not to assess 
their merits on some principled basis—but in order to extort the parties, and particularly 
the settling defendants, into ransoming a settlement that could otherwise be undermined 
by a time-consuming appeals process”). One court equivalently characterized professional 
objectors as attorneys who “have a pattern or practice of objecting to class action 
settlements for the purpose of securing a settlement from class counsel.” In re Initial Pub. 
Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Professional objectors on 
occasion may themselves be class members. See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., No. 04-
md-15863, 2011 WL 1102999, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2011) (noting that professional 
objector “has objected or represented objectors in at least six other class actions”). However, 
we are aware of no situation in which an attorney has engaged in the kind of repeat 
behavior that is characteristic of professional objectors without usually representing class 
members. The definition of professional objectors might be expanded to include attorneys 
who raise meritless objections to settlements in the district court merely to extort payoffs. 
See, e.g., Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that lawyers who 
intervene at the district court in a class action settlement process “not to increase the value 
of the settlement, but in order to get paid to go away,” could be called professional 
objectors). We use a narrower definition. Unless objections are made in the shadow of a 
threat to appeal, frivolous objections are not likely to impose a substantial social cost. See 
infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
 3.  Defendants, too, may have an interest in terminating litigation expeditiously, and 
they may also attempt to thwart professional objectors. But the interests of defendants in 
expedition are different from those of class counsel, see infra notes 99-100 and 
accompanying text, and we therefore focus on the bargain struck between objectors and 
class counsel. 
 4.  Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, 
at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (“[P]rofessional objectors can levy what is effectively a tax on 
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nutshell, professional objectors profit by extorting payments from 
class counsel.5 They “can make a living simply by filing frivolous 
appeals and thereby slowing down the execution of settlements.”6 Not 
surprisingly, they are unpopular, “perhaps the least popular parties 
in the history of civil procedure.”7 A judge has observed that 
“[f]ederal courts are increasingly weary of professional objectors.”8
 The foundation of this cottage industry is the collective nature of 
class actions when used to aggregate small claims and the desire to 
address the divergent interests of claimants and class counsel. When 
each plaintiff’s stake in the outcome of litigation is small, no plaintiff 
has an appreciable incentive to monitor the conduct of class counsel. 
Class counsel have an incentive to seek a settlement that maximizes 
attorneys’ fees at the expense of class compensation, and defendants 
have an incentive to accept such a settlement to end the litigation.9
 This well-known dynamic has prompted Congress and the 
Supreme Court to design procedural measures intended to protect 
the class from overreaching by its lawyers. First, in the most common 
form of class action and the one analyzed in this Article,10 class 
class action settlements, a tax that has no benefit to anyone other than to the objectors.”);  
see also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 2011 WL 5873389, at *24 n.30 (agreeing 
with the court’s characterization in Barnes).
 5.  We use the term extortion and its cognates in a nontechnical sense to mean “the 
act of wresting money from a person by threat or misuse of authority.” See NEW OXFORD
AM. DICTIONARY 613 (3d ed. 2010). For an example of this use of the term in the relevant 
context, see In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 n.12 (W.D. Pa. 2003) 
(repeating class counsels’ characterization of the efforts of professional objectors “as 
nothing short of ‘an attempt at legalized extortion in the guise of an objection’ ”). See also 
In re Initial Pub. Offering, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (“[P]rofessional objectors undermine the 
administration of justice by disrupting settlement in the hopes of extorting a greater share 
of the settlement for themselves and their clients.”). Similarly, we use the term blackmail
as a synonym, to mean “the act of coercing someone to do something by threat.” See NEW 
OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY 176 (3d ed. 2010); see also Vollmer, 350 F.3d at 660 (“In the 
context of intervening in a class action settlement, extortion would mean intervening not to 
increase the value of the settlement, but in order to get paid to go away.”). 
 6.  Barnes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3. 
 7.  Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness 
Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 472 (2003). 
 8.  O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 2003);  
see also Trombley v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 08-cv-456-JD, 2011 WL 3740488, at *5  
(D.R.I. Aug. 24, 2011) (“Courts have recognized the problems caused by so-called  
professional objectors . . . .”). 
 9.  See, e.g., In re Pet Foods Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 359 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(Weis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the court has “observed on 
a number of occasions” that class action defendants are “interested primarily in ‘buying 
peace’ ”). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, 
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) [hereinafter 
Coffee, Class Action Accountability]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial 
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1987). 
 10.  Although we focus on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions brought to obtain damages, much 
of our analysis is applicable to the other two types of class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P.
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members must be informed that they can opt out of the action, 
potentially twice,11 thereby avoiding any conclusive effect of a 
settlement. Second, a district court is obliged to examine the 
proposed settlement critically, allowing any class member to oppose 
it,12 and conduct a hearing,13 a process intended to provide the court 
with information and argument relevant to the court’s decision. A 
court may approve the settlement only if it is “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”14 For its part, the Supreme Court has held that an 
objecting nonnamed class member is a “party” to the action and 
therefore has a right to appeal a final judgment approving a 
settlement.15 It is this broad right of appeal that enables a 
professional objector to find nonnamed class members willing to lend 
their names to a dubious objection and a meritless appeal in the 
expectation that class counsel will pay a handsome sum to make the 
complainants go away.16 The professional objector typically does not 
anticipate prosecuting the appeal to a judicial decision; if class 
counsel unexpectedly fail to pony up, she can withdraw the appeal. 
 If the law were unconcerned with the legitimate interests of class 
members, suppressing professional objectors would be easy. The right 
to appeal the approval of a settlement could be limited to named 
parties. But these interests are important, and even if denying 
23(b)(1)–(2). All that is necessary for a professional objector to engage successfully in 
extortion is that a class settlement provide for class counsel attorneys’ fees that are 
delayed or placed in jeopardy by an appeal. That condition will almost always be satisfied 
even if the class receives only injunctive relief. 
 11.  If a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the typical method by which plaintiffs 
aggregate small claims and sue for damages, before a settlement is reached, notice must be 
provided to class members that they will be excluded from the class upon request. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). If the parties reach a settlement after class certification, the court 
may refuse to approve it unless it affords a new opportunity for class members to request 
exclusion. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4). If a class is certified for settlement purposes, therefore, 
the class members would receive a single notice of their ability to opt out. 
 12.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5). 
 13.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 14.  Id.
 15.  See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). Devlin involved an action brought 
under Rule 23(b)(1), which does not afford class members the ability to opt out of a 
settlement. This fact was of some importance to the Court, see id. at 10, and therefore one 
cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that the Court would have denied nonnamed 
members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, who do have the ability to opt out, the right to appeal. 
But the ability to opt out was a subsidiary reason for the Court’s result, and therefore the 
case stands for the proposition that nonnamed members of a class certified under any 
provision of the Federal Rules who object to a settlement have a right to appeal a judgment 
approving it. 
 16.  See generally In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-
00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at *1 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010) (resisting the term 
“professional objectors” but finding that “[o]bjectors’ counsel have a documented history of 
filing notices of appeal from orders approving other class action settlements, and thereafter 
dismissing said appeals when they and their clients were compensated by the settling class 
or counsel for the settling class”). 
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nonnamed class members the right to appeal is the best policy, it is 
not obviously so. Interlopers may object to a settlement because it 
favors class counsel at the expense of the class, and they may pursue 
an appeal when the district court mistakenly approves it.17
Sometimes they are vindicated.18
 Legitimate objectors are valuable, therefore, though their value 
should not be overstated. Objectors may not have access to 
substantially more information than a district court, and to that 
extent, their contribution to the court’s deliberative process would be 
limited. The approach advocated in this Article would not impede the 
submission of objections to a district court but would instead 
potentially inhibit appeals. It may, therefore, result in a higher rate 
of uncorrected analytical errors by the district court. But it will not 
reduce the amount of information available to the district court or, in 
cases that are appealed, the appellate court. Judicial decisions based 
on incomplete information may very well be incorrect, but any 
procedural mechanism that restricts appeals by objectors does not 
reduce the amount of information available to a court. 
 The ideal approach to class settlement objections would, at zero 
administrative cost, eliminate all extortionate appeals without 
deterring any legitimate appeal. Courts and others have proposed a 
number of methods for dealing with professional objectors, and every 
one of them is flawed.19 For example, the law might prohibit 
nonnamed members of opt-out classes, or even all classes, from 
appealing an approved settlement, on the grounds that the attendant 
costs imposed on legitimate objectors are less than the benefit of 
 17.  See In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 629 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(noting the important role played by “interlopers who oppose a proposed settlement . . . in 
preventing cozy deals that favor class lawyers and defendants at the expense of class 
members”); Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 
intervention to “rais[e] the value of a class action settlement” is “entirely proper”). 
 18.  See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(reversing approval of settlement where the record did not demonstrate “that the 
settlement will benefit the class in any way”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 
277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing settlement approval where the district “judge did not 
give the issue of the settlement’s adequacy the care that it deserved”); In re Telectronics 
Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing approval where district court 
relied on decision subsequently reversed by Supreme Court). 
 19.  Although the problem of professional objectors has not been extensively discussed 
in the literature, it is noted and explored in some depth in the following: Nicholas 
Barnhorst, How Many Kicks At the Cat?: Multiple Settlement Protests By Class Members 
Who Have Refused to Opt Out, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 107 (2005); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The 
End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2009); Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping 
the Flies out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors to Class Action Settlements, 84 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 949 (2010); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be 
Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 155 (2001); Geoffrey P. Miller & 
Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 120 
n.64 (1997); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 571, 618 (1997); and Brunet, supra note 7. 
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suppressing hold-ups.20 The law could require nonnamed class 
members to intervene in the action at the district court level as a 
condition of pursuing an appeal,21 a position once advanced by the 
Department of Justice.22 District courts have allowed class counsel to 
take, or have themselves initiated, discovery into the behavior of 
attorneys suspected of being professional objectors, the class status of 
their clients, and the arrangements between them; courts could 
impose sanctions if unethical or otherwise improper conduct were 
found.23 The appellate court might be required to screen appeals, 
dismissing quickly those clearly lacking in merit. They might be 
allowed to impose penalties for groundless objections, perhaps at 
amounts far larger than are now generally imposed for frivolous 
appeals.24 A recent innovation is the use in settlement agreements of 
“quick-pay” provisions, which require the defendants to pay plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees upon approval of the settlement by the district court, 
regardless of any appeal; the idea is that because plaintiffs’ counsel 
will not incur serious costs of delay during the pendency of an appeal, 
they will not pay objectors to drop their appeal, and objectors will 
therefore have no incentive to appeal.25
 Each of these mechanisms misses the mark because it does not 
eradicate extortionate behavior, suppresses legitimate behavior, or 
entails excessive administrative costs. In a recent article, Brian 
Fitzpatrick proposes an innovative method that he asserts is “a 
complete solution to the blackmail problem”26: an inalienability rule 
prohibiting objectors from settling their appeals.27 He argues that if a 
professional objector cannot sell her right to appeal, the objector will 
have no incentive to file the appeal, whereas legitimate objectors and 
their attorneys will not be deterred because their intent is to secure a 
favorable appellate decision.28 Though the proposal is creative, we 
believe that it is flawed. The extortion that is the business of 
professional objectors can be successfully undertaken before the right 
vests. Moreover, Fitzpatrick would allow appeals once undertaken to 
be abandoned, but he would rely on a court of appeals to insure that 
 20.  See, e.g., Barnhorst, supra note 19, at 109 (“[F]ailure to opt out of a class, either 
prior to settlement or at the settlement stage, should, in the interests of efficiency and 
equity, foreclose the opportunity to appeal a district court’s settlement approval.”). 
 21.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (defining the procedural device of intervention). 
 22.  See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 11 (2002). 
 23.  See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294-95 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 24.  See FED. R. APP. P. 38 (permitting an appellate court to “award just damages and 
single or double costs” for frivolous appeals). 
 25.  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 19, at 1641. 
 26.  Id. at 1627. 
 27.  Id. at 1659. 
 28. Id. at 1662. 
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the appellant is not being paid off to withdraw the appeal.29 We are 
skeptical that appellate courts are institutionally equipped to police 
what are in substance side payments. 
 We favor a significant modification of an approach now in use. 
District courts sometimes impose appeal bonds on objectors,30 but the 
amount of the bond is tightly constrained. Some circuits hold that 
bonds are limited to the relatively trivial costs identified in the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and a federal appellate cost 
statute.31 Other circuits hold that bonds are constrained by any 
statute underlying the cause of action. Depending on that statute, 
courts have held that the bond may or may not reflect the attorneys’ 
fees of class counsel on appeal32 or the cost of delay in final resolution 
of the case.33 One circuit allows bonds that include attorneys’ fees if 
authorized by the underlying statute,34 but it also allows bonds in 
 29. Id. at 1664. 
 30.  See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 7 (authorizing district court to require an appellant to file 
a bond to ensure payment of costs on appeal); In re Enfamil Lipil Mktg. & Sales Practices 
Litig., No. 11-MD-02222, 2012 WL 1189763, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2012) (requiring 
settlement objector to post appeal bond); Gemelas v. Dannon Co., No. 1:08CV236, 2010 WL 
3703811, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2010) (same); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 
F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same); In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices 
Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010) (same); 
Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *9-10 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (same); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv. 
5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007) (same); Barnes v. 
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. C.A. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *8 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (same); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust 
Litig., No. MDL 1361, 2003 WL 22417252, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (same). 
 31.  See Hirschensohn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. 96-7312, 1997 WL 307777, at *1 
(3d Cir. June 10, 1997) (holding that appeal bonds are limited to costs specified in Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 39); In re Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“The costs referred to [in Rule 7] . . . are simply those that may be 
taxed against an unsuccessful litigant under Federal Appellate Rule 39 . . . .”). 
 32.  See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the “costs on appeal” that may be included in an appeal bond under Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 7 include attorneys’ fees permitted by the applicable fee-
shifting statute); Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035(HB), 2011 WL 
5873383, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (holding that district courts in the Second Circuit 
may include attorneys’ fees in an appeal bond when authorized by the substantive statute 
but not merely because the court deems the appeal frivolous); Cobell v. Salazar, Civ. No. 
96-01285(TFH), 2011 WL 4590776, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting that in the D.C. 
Circuit, an appeal bond is limited to the costs taxable pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 39 “as well as attorneys’ fees to the extent an underlying statute 
deems such fees to be ‘costs’ ”); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach 
Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL 5147222, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2010) (“An appeal 
bond may only include attorneys’ fees as costs where an underlying statute in the case 
contains a fee shifting provision.”). 
 33.  See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 (holding that 
“costs incident to delay” may be included in an appeal bond only if included in the 
definition of “costs” contained in the underlying statute). 
 34.  See Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 420 F. App’x 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding 
that an appeal bond may include attorneys’ fees where the underlying statute treats them 
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amounts unconstrained by rule or statute where the appeal is 
frivolous.35 Appeal bonds, therefore, can be insubstantial. District 
courts should be permitted in all cases to impose appeal bonds on 
nonnamed class member objectors that reflect the full expected cost 
of appeal, including attorneys’ fees and the cost of delay incurred by 
class members and their attorneys. A court would presumptively 
require a bond in the full amount but would have discretion to reduce 
the amount when it concludes that the appeal is legitimate and the 
appellant is financially unable to post a bond in the full amount. 
 We make no claim that our approach is ideal, but we see no 
perfect approach. Rather, our approach offers the greatest net value 
among a set of imperfect alternatives. Though bonds correctly set and 
routinely imposed will predictably deter most frivolous appeals, they 
may deter legitimate appeals as well. The principal danger, 
therefore, is that the bond approach to extortionate behavior will 
produce false positives. A court’s discretion to reduce the amount of 
the bond required of legitimate objectors creates a risk that the court 
will mistakenly refrain from requiring a full bond from professional 
objectors, a false negative, but that risk seems small. The real danger 
is that district courts will be biased in favor of ending the litigation 
and for that reason impose a bond that will effectively quash 
legitimate appeals. 
 That possibility cannot be dismissed, but for several reasons the 
expected cost of the error may be modest. First, the strongest 
legitimate appeals will not be deterred by a bond requirement, and 
given the scope of review, the number of erroneous decisions that 
would have been corrected on appeal is likely to be small. Second, the 
experience of one of us (Smith) in the federal judiciary is that district 
judges are generally conscientious in performing their function, even 
when being so does not further their narrow self-interest in clearing 
their dockets. Third, courts now occasionally refuse to require appeal 
bonds of attorneys believed to be professional objectors because their 
appeals happen to raise legitimate issues.36 Finally, experience with 
existing procedural mechanisms that call upon a district court to 
assess the propriety of an appeal as a predicate to obtaining 
as costs and therefore not reaching issue of whether bond may include them where appeal 
is frivolous). 
 35.  See Sckolnick v. Harlow, 820 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that an appeal 
bond could include attorneys’ fees where district court found that appeal might  
be frivolous). 
 36.  See, e.g., In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 
MDL No. 08-1999, 2010 WL 4630846, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2010) (refusing to require 
attorneys assumed to be professional objectors to post appeal bonds where “there are 
legitimate issues to pursue on appeal”). 
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appellate review is encouraging.37 Our approach can be likened to one 
under which objectors are precluded from appealing the approval of a 
class action settlement unless the district court certifies the case for 
appellate review. The bond approach is preferable, because it is less 
radical legally than the certification approach and somewhat less 
preclusive in effect. The certification alternative, however, resembles 
the current mechanism for interlocutory appellate review.38
  Experience with the certification mechanism is instructive. The 
two certification contexts differ: failure of the court to certify a case 
at an interlocutory stage merely postpones a party’s right of appeal, 
whereas under the approach pertaining to class action settlements, 
failure to certify precludes appeal. Nevertheless, many of the 
incentives that arguably incline a district court to snuff out appeals 
of class settlements are at work when a court is asked to permit 
interlocutory appeal in a civil case or issue a certificate of 
appealability in a habeas case, and district courts do certify these 
cases. Indeed, similar incentives would seem to incline district courts 
to refuse to issue certificates of appealability from certain habeas 
corpus decisions,39 and courts issue these certificates as well. 
 The possibility that legitimate appeals will be stifled is, therefore, 
the principal cost of the proposal. Whatever that cost is, the risk of 
error is mitigated somewhat by the ability of appellate courts to 
exercise their mandamus power to override the district court’s 
decision and order the court to reduce a bond.40 Mandamus is an 
extraordinary remedy,41 however, and it therefore only mitigates the 
risk of overbreadth. Some legitimate appeals would likely be deterred.   
 Whether professional objectors are truly a problem depends on the 
value of the activity they disrupt. An irony in condemning their 
behavior as extortionate is that the conduct of class action lawyers in 
some cases can also be described as extortionate. A class action can 
be brought with little hope of success on the merits and merely to 
extract a settlement from defendants, who have a powerful interest 
in avoiding the costs of litigation and face even a tiny probability of 
an enormous judgment.42 Few would have sympathy for extortionists 
 37. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text. 
 38.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (authorizing interlocutory appeal upon certification 
by district court). 
 39.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2006) (requiring a district or circuit judge to issue a 
certificate of appealability as a condition of appeal). 
 40.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). 
 41.  Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1989) (recognizing that the 
extraordinary remedy of mandamus may be used by appellate court to address clear abuse 
of discretion by district court). 
 42.  See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” 
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1391-92, 
1402-04 (2000). 
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held up by other extortionists, and a public interest justification for 
incurring any cost to eradicate professional objectors would be hard 
to find.43 But surely many class actions serve a valuable function in 
achieving the economies of scale necessary to bring a civil case 
against wrongdoers and thereby deter violations of law.44
Professional objectors are indiscriminate. Those who file frivolous 
objections tax the extortionate class action as well as the productive 
one, and it is the tax on the latter that justifies measures to suppress  
their conduct. 
 We proceed as follows:  In Part II, we outline the problem posed by 
professional objectors. We explain why professional objectors can 
succeed in an extortionate strategy and why their conduct is 
inefficient. In Part III, we analyze several methods that might be 
used to address their conduct. In Part IV, we survey the law on 
appeal bonds and detail our proposal. We conclude in Part V. 
II. UNDERSTANDING PROFESSIONAL OBJECTORS
 A “professional objector” can be loosely defined as an attorney who 
on behalf of one or more nonnamed class members routinely submits 
unsuccessful objections to settlements and threatens to file 
insubstantial appeals of settlement approvals merely to obtain 
payoffs from class counsel.45 Though the definition is analytically 
 43.  See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[C]lass actions create the opportunity for a kind of 
legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a large 
class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement far in excess of 
the individual claims’ actual worth.”); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price 
Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197, 218 n.52 (D. Me. 2003) (“[T]he class action device 
promotes the filing of spurious lawsuits forcing defendants to pay only in order to avoid the 
high expenses of class action litigation.”). 
 44.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 785 (8th ed. 2011); 
Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective 
Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 563 (1996); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8-9 
(1991); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of 
the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 720-25 (2006); Hay & Rosenberg, 
supra note 42, at 1383-89. 
 45.  One district court cited approvingly the following description of the behavior of 
professional objectors: 
‘[T]he unfortunate game is to lodge pro forma objections at the trial 
stage, then negotiate a private resolution in order to drop the invariable 
notice of appeal. Once the case has progressed beyond the trial court, 
there is no longer any accountability for side payments to objectors’ 
counsel, and the game is on.’ 
In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 09-MD-02036-JLK, 2011 WL 5873389, at *24 
n.30 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2011) (quoting declaration of Prof. Samuel Issacharoff). We 
deliberately exclude from this definition and our analysis counsel for named class members 
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useful, it is problematic as a legal standard to the extent it depends 
on motivation.46 Judges are reluctant to ascribe improper motives to 
objectors when negative consequences flow from such a 
determination.47 Some objective measure of intent is helpful in 
identifying the kind of objector that should be deterred, and the best 
one is the objective probability that an objection will ultimately 
succeed on the merits. Professional objectors typically file objections 
irrespective of merit and that have a low probability of success, a 
principle that accords with intuitive notions of extortionate behavior. 
A lawyer who specializes in disrupting class action settlements may 
on occasion hit upon a valid objection—one with a high probability of 
success. Whether the lawyer is called a professional objector is not 
important. All that is important is that the conduct in the exceptional 
case not be deterred. That is the policy objective explored in this 
Article. A critical variable in identifying extortionate conduct, then, is 
the objective probability of legal success. But that is only one variable. 
 Broadly speaking, the point of an objection should be to obtain 
greater compensation for at least some members of the class than the 
settlement provides. A settlement may be deficient for three principal 
reasons. First, the total amount of the settlement fund may be 
inadequate. Second, the attorneys’ fees may represent an undue 
who disagree with a settlement acceptable to other class counsel. Intra-class counsel 
disputes potentially raise issues that arise in professional objector appeals, but they are 
more likely to result in legitimate appeals, and they are not the focus of this Article. 
Indeed, appeals by named class representatives serve as a useful check on settlements that 
promote the interests of defendants and class counsel at the expense of the class, given 
that the proposal outlined in this Article may suppress some legitimate appeals by 
nonnamed class members. 
 46.  Two commentators observe, “While it is possible that the motivations of a 
particular objector’s counsel could be mixed or unclear, most practitioners would agree that 
the term ‘professional objector’ is susceptible to the same ‘I know it when I see it’ standard 
as Justice Potter Stewart’s standard for identifying obscenity.” Paul Karlsgodt & Raj 
Chohan, Class Action Settlement Objectors: Minor Nuisance or Serious Threat to Final 
Approval?, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA), Aug. 12, 2011 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). The authors define professional objectors as 
“attorneys who solicit members of a class in order to raise objections to a class settlement, 
in the hopes of extracting a portion of the fee or taking over as class counsel.” Id.
 47. See, e.g., In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 
MDL No. 08-1999, 2010 WL 4630846, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2010) (finding that though 
“the objectors’ true motives [might be] to obstruct the settlement in the hopes of ‘getting 
paid to go away,’ . . . the evidence in the record does not enable me to find that any objector 
is pursuing his or her appeal for an improper purpose”) (quoting Vollmer v. Selden, 350 
F.3d 656, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2003)); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-
MD-1775 (JG)(VVP), 2010 WL 1049269, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010) (concluding that 
evidence of “bad faith or vexatious conduct” in other similar litigations was insufficient to 
support a finding of such conduct in instant litigation); Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. 
Am., No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640, at *9-10 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2000) 
(acknowledging concern that objectors’ lawyers might be marauding proposed settlements 
to extort the parties, but finding that the record did not demonstrate “a pressing need for 
our preservation of the Court processes”).  
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proportion of the fund, so that lower attorneys’ fees would result in 
greater compensation to the class as a whole.48 Third, some members 
of the class may deserve a larger share of the fund than the 
settlement specifies. This last objection raises an intraclass 
distributional issue, not an issue of total compensation to the class. 
The monetary value of the objection is the benefit to the complaining 
group, even if other members of the class would suffer an offsetting 
loss.49 An identifiable group within a class has no legal obligation to 
subsidize other class members. A variant of this objection is that the 
class contains members with conflicting interests and was therefore 
improperly defined;50 properly defined classes would have produced a 
different settlement, one that favored some group, though the 
amount of the incremental benefit cannot be estimated in advance of 
settlement negotiations. This structural objection has the same 
implication as one that pertains directly to the distribution of the 
settlement among class members: the settlement reflects a loss to a 
group within the class. In all three major categories, at least some 
group within the class would benefit if the objection were sustained.51
 One way to begin to distinguish between legitimate and 
extortionate appeals is to compare the appellant’s cost of appeal to 
the expected monetary value of a successful resolution by the 
 48.  A settlement might provide for attorneys’ fees separate from the fund used to 
compensate class members. Objectors might sensibly contend, however, that the 
compensatory fund would have been larger if attorneys’ fees had been lower. But see Perez 
v. Asurion Corp., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D1047, D1050 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that class 
counsel’s fees were not being paid out of funds designated for class recovery and “[t]hus, 
there is no reduction in the Class members’ recovery to pay the lawyers”). 
 49.  A subcategory of the third objection is that the settlement provides for excessive 
incentive awards to class representatives. See, e.g., Dewey v. Volkswagen of America, 728 
F. Supp. 2d 546, 577-78 (D.N.J. 2010) (rejecting objection that $10,000 incentive awards 
were excessive in part because the payments did not diminish the money available to the 
class). The import of this objection is that nonnamed class members suffer a disadvantage 
relative to class representatives under the settlement to the extent that total class 
compensation is fixed. 
 50.  When a class contains members with divergent interests, the class fails the 
requirement for certification that representative class members “will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1997) (concluding that certification of a settlement class 
was improper for want of adequate representation where the interests of those within the 
class were not aligned). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5) permits a class to be 
subdivided into subclasses when a single class contains members with antagonistic 
interests. See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 51.  Objectors might make other challenges. For example, they might complain about 
the disposition of unclaimed funds. If the argument is that unclaimed funds should not 
revert to the defendants as a way of preserving the deterrent effect of the settlement, the 
objection would not necessarily imply any monetary benefit for members of the class. For 
example, a cy pres distribution would prevent reversion but would not provide value to the 
class. By contrast, objectors might seek a residual distribution that did directly benefit the 
class. Under our definition, the first kind of objection would represent a zero monetary 
value to the class, and the second would reflect a positive value. 
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appellate court to the class members on whose behalf the appeal is 
filed.52 A legitimate appeal, as we use the term, will always have a 
positive expected monetary value. For example, an appeal that would 
cost the appellant $2000 to prosecute and has a 10% probability of 
resulting in an appellate decision awarding the class an additional 
$50,000 has a positive expected monetary value of $3000. An 
extortionate appeal, by contrast, may have either a positive or a 
negative expected monetary value. Such an appeal may be brought 
not to obtain a judicial decision but to obtain a payoff, even when the 
appeal has a positive expected monetary value.53 A positive expected 
monetary value, therefore, is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of a legitimate appeal, and it is calculated by reference to the value to 
class members, not the value to their attorney. Professional objectors, 
like class counsel, pose an agency problem. The lawyer’s interests 
diverge from those of her clients. Successful appeals will likely result 
in attorneys’ fees that are some fraction of the benefits secured for 
class members. But the legitimacy of the appeal depends upon the 
benefits that are sought for the principals rather than their agent. 
 As the above example suggests, an appeal may have a negative 
expected monetary value—a characteristic of an extortionate 
appeal—even when the probability of a favorable judicial resolution 
is positive. The expected monetary value is a net determination that 
depends on the costs of appeal. Change the costs of appeal in the 
example to $6000 and the expected monetary value of the appeal is 
negative $1000. These costs consist of both the direct costs of  
appeal incurred by the attorney representing objecting class 
members on appeal and the costs of delay in implementing the 
settlement incurred by class members who stand to gain by a 
successful appeal; they do not include the appellate costs of counsel 
defending the settlement. 
 To understand the motivation and success of professional 
objectors, one must focus on their private incentives, not the interests 
of the class members they represent. In general, professional 
objectors can succeed because the costs they incur in an appeal are 
 52.  The implication of our definition is that an appeal taken in a quixotic but sincere 
attempt to win a favorable resolution, one that might require a change in the law, for 
instance, would likely be illegitimate. Such an appeal is not the kind of appeal pursued by 
professional objectors. But we use the term “legitimate” in this Article only for convenience, 
and the fact that it does not precisely capture the difference between appeals brought by 
professional objectors and those brought by others is not important to our analysis. 
Besides, the number of sincere but illegitimate appeals is likely to be very small. 
 53.  Cf. Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that a 
nonfrivolous claim might nevertheless be brought for the extortionate purpose of causing 
delay “in the hope of getting paid” to go away). 
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less than the costs class counsel incur.54 In the typical case, the 
professional objector threatens to impose a substantial cost on class 
counsel.55 Suppose class counsel are concerned only about their 
compensation and would receive $1 million in fees under the terms of 
the settlement. An appeal delays implementation of the settlement, 
including in most cases payment of attorneys’ fees. A one-year delay 
during the pendency of appeal at an interest rate of 5% represents a 
loss of $50,000 to class counsel. Suppose class counsel incur direct 
costs of $10,000 in litigating the appeal. Even if the appeal is certain 
to lose, it will cost class counsel $60,000. Class counsel could pay the 
professional objector any amount up to $60,000 in exchange for 
dropping the appeal and be better off—the maximum amount 
declines as the date of appellate resolution approaches because the 
cost of delay diminishes. Notice that in this example, the payment 
does not reduce the compensation received by the class. Paying off 
the professional objector serves the private interests of class counsel 
without compromising the interests of the class. 
 In contrast to the costs that class counsel would incur in an 
appeal, the professional objector’s costs of appeal are relatively low. 
For one thing, because the objector is not entitled to attorneys’ fees 
under the settlement, the objector does not incur a cost of delayed 
payment of an obligation. Time in reaching a deal with class counsel 
imposes merely an opportunity cost in the use of the payoff. For 
another, the professional objector’s appellate litigation fees can be 
very low. The objector can base objections on grounds routinely 
asserted in opposition to class settlements based on inherently 
malleable principles. For example, fees paid to class counsel must be 
reasonable,56 but reasonableness is a standard, not a rule, and its 
 54.  For expositional clarity and to reflect actual practice, the analysis in this section 
excludes the interests of defendants. Defendants’ interests are more complicated than the 
interests of class counsel, though defendants have an interest in defending a settlement 
once it is agreed upon. See Karlsgodt & Chohan, supra note 46, at 2 (“The problem of 
dealing with professional objectors is customarily the role of plaintiffs’ counsel, although 
after having agreed to a settlement, the defendant has just as much of an incentive to 
overcome objections as the plaintiffs’ lawyers do.”). 
 55.  For illustrative purposes, this Article focuses on the situation in which a single 
professional objector threatens to appeal the approval of a settlement. In reality, several 
professional objectors might threaten to appeal. The existence of multiple objectors 
complicates the bargaining game. The objectors might collude, or each objector might 
pursue a settlement unilaterally. When objectors act unilaterally, each may attempt to 
hold out and settle last, for even a single appeal will delay implementation of the class 
settlement. The existence of multiple objectors acting unilaterally may delay or even 
thwart a settlement with class counsel, and it may increase the total amount paid to the 
objectors to withhold or to withdraw their appeals. We do not explore further the 
implications of multiple objections. 
 56.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (allowing the court to award “reasonable attorney’s fees”). 
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determination is fact specific.57 A professional objector can almost 
always assert, ostensibly in good faith, that the attorneys’ fees 
awarded in a settlement are excessive. Because many of the 
standards for class actions and class settlements are fundamentally 
general, objections can be taken off the rack or even made out of 
whole cloth.58 Likewise, appellate briefs can be assembled from 
ready-made pieces, with little tailoring.59 Broad statements about the 
impermissibility of excessive class counsel fees supported by citations 
to a few cases can be pasted into nearly any brief challenging a  
settlement approval. 
 When the expected monetary value of the appeal to the objector is 
positive, it is easy to see why the parties would reach a bargain. As 
noted above, the objector is driven by private interests, not the 
interests of the class. Suppose the objector would incur direct 
litigation costs of $5000 in pursuing an appeal that if successful 
would increase the amount paid to the class by $1,000,000 without 
reducing attorneys’ fees. The objector would not be entitled to all of 
the attorneys’ fees that might be awarded for securing the increment 
on behalf of the class, for the increment is a joint product of the 
efforts of class counsel and the objector; the objector would not be 
able to obtain an increment unless class counsel obtained the base 
amount, and class counsel are entitled to a share of attorneys’ fees 
 57.  See generally MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“A rule singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them conclusive of legal liability; a 
standard permits consideration of all or at least most facts that are relevant to the 
standard's rationale.”). 
 58.  See, e.g., Taubenfeld v. Aon Corp., 415 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that 
an objection failed to “articulate” the objector’s argument challenging attorneys’ fees and 
contained “conclusory allegations”); In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., No. 04-md-15863, 2011 
WL 1102999, at *1 n.1, *3 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2011) (noting that professional objector “raises 
boilerplate objections related to the adequacy of class compensation, the suitability of the 
class representative, and the amount of proposed attorneys’ fees”); Gemelas v. Dannon Co., 
No. 1:08 CV 236, 2010 WL 3703811, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2010) (noting that objector 
filed “form objections” in two cases “with only minor changes in the headings and 
arguments to make them applicable to the defendant” in the second case); In re Initial Pub. 
Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 496-97 n.219 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting class 
counsels’ assertion that other courts had criticized the objectors’ “canned objections”); In re
UnitedHealth Group Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009) 
(describing objector’s pleading as “disingenuous” and observing that it “presented no facts, 
offered no law, and raised no argument upon which the Court relied”); In re AOL Time 
Warner ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 8853(SWK), 2007 WL 4225486, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 
2007) (observing that objection “contained arguments counterproductive to the resolution 
of the litigation” and arguments “that were irrelevant or simply incorrect”); In re Royal 
Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 383, 386 (D. Md. 2006) (concluding that a 
professional objector “provided no coherent explanation for his contention” that class 
counsels’ fees were excessive and that the objection “was not well reasoned and was  
not helpful”). 
 59.  Cf. Gemelas, 2010 WL 3703811, at *2 (referring to objector’s appeal as a  
“form appeal”). 
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awarded for the increment.60 Nevertheless, the objector would be 
entitled to some fraction of the increment, and suppose the objector 
would be awarded 10% of the increment, or $100,000. If the appeal 
has a 10% chance of success, the expected monetary value of the 
appeal to the objector is $5000 ((.10 x $100,000) – $5000).61 In 
bargaining theory terminology, this is the objector’s threat value, or 
threat point, the payoff the objector would obtain in the 
noncooperative solution.62 Assuming class counsel would make any 
payment to the objector from attorneys’ fees and not class 
compensation, class counsel would also be pursuing solely their 
private interest. If the net expected cost of the appeal to class counsel 
is $60,000,63 representing a negative threat value, a payment to the 
objector could make both parties better off. Class counsel would be 
willing to pay any amount up to $60,000, and the objector would be 
willing to accept any amount over $5000. Just what payment 
between $5000 and $60,000 class counsel would make, or stated 
otherwise, just how the parties would divide the cooperative surplus, 
is the stuff of bargaining theory and is not important for present 
purposes; one reasonable assumption is that the parties would split 
the surplus of $55,000, and class counsel would pay the objector 
$32,500. What is important is that a payoff to avoid or end the appeal 
is in the mutual economic self-interest of both parties.  
 But will extortion work when the expected monetary value of the 
appeal to the objector is negative? If the objector stands to gain 
nothing from an appeal, her threat to file the appeal may not be 
credible. Class counsel could simply refuse to pay even if they would 
incur substantial costs were the objector to appeal, secure in the 
knowledge that the objector will not, in fact, appeal. 
 60.  See In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 629 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that objecting counsel was not entitled to all attorneys’ fees awarded for 
increasing a settlement fund over the amount negotiated by other class counsel). 
 61.  The utility to the objector of the uncertain outcome will depend upon the objector’s 
attitude toward risk.  For simplicity, we assume that the objector is risk neutral, so that 
the objector derives the same utility from an uncertain outcome as from a certain outcome 
of equal expected monetary value. 
 62.  For introductions to cooperative game theory and bargaining theory as relevant 
here, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 74-76 (6th ed. 2012) and 
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 357-84 (4th ed. 2007). 
 63.  In the scenario posed, the expected monetary value of the appeal to class counsel 
is the direct cost of the appeal plus the cost of delay minus the expected gain in attorneys’ 
fees that would be awarded class counsel on the incremental settlement amount. This is 
the threat value of class counsel, and in this example, it is a negative number. Of course, 
the objector’s appeal may challenge the amount of the attorneys’ fees stipulated in the 
settlement or might otherwise attack the settlement in ways that, if successful, would 
reduce the fees or require additional effort by class counsel for no compensation. In that 
event, the net expected cost of the appeal would include the value of that expected cost. 
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 A threat to prosecute an appeal with a negative expected 
monetary value might be credible, however, for two reasons: because 
the objector will reach a point at which further action is less costly 
than the expected value of the appeal; or because the objector derives 
value from creating a reputation through repeated behavior. First, 
recognize that an appeal may have a negative expected monetary 
value even if the probability of success in the appellate court is 
positive. An appeal costs something, even if the brief is cobbled 
together from stock parts. If the appeal has a very low probability of 
success or the attorneys’ fees the objector would be awarded are 
insubstantial, the cost of the appeal in the aggregate may exceed the 
expected return. But in the language of game theory, all that is 
necessary in a single-game setting to make a threat of appellate 
litigation credible is that a point will be reached when the objector 
can withdraw the appeal and the marginal cost of pursuing it is less 
than its expected monetary value.64 At that point, the expected 
monetary value of continuing the appeal is positive. And because the 
threat is credible at that point, backward induction leads to the 
conclusion that the threat to appeal at the outset is credible.65
Normally in appellate litigation, the appellant is required to file a 
brief within two months or so of filing the notice of appeal. After that 
point, the objector’s cost of appeal is trivial; she may choose not to file 
a reply brief, and she may not even be required to participate in oral 
argument if the court chooses to dispense with it. But resolution of 
the appeal may be months away, and during the interim class 
counsel will incur delay costs. A deal during this period can make 
both sides better off.   
 Moreover, the assumption that the appeal has a positive 
probability of success implies that the expected cost of the appeal to 
class counsel may entail more than the direct cost of litigation and 
the cost of delay pending resolution. If the appeal results in an order 
that reduces class counsel fees or further delays their receipt, 
perhaps by requiring the district court to reconsider or restructure 
the settlement, the benefit to class counsel of terminating the  
appeal increases, and all else equal, the amount of the payoff to the  
objector increases. 
 The above analysis depends on the assumption that the appeal 
has some positive probability of success. An appeal may have an 
aggregate expected negative value because it has a zero probability of 
success, but even then the threat of an appeal can be credible. 
 64.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success 
of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-7 (1996). 
 65. Id.
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Professional objectors file objections serially;66 in game-theoretic 
terms, they are repeat players. Taking an action that will impose a 
net expected cost on the player himself is not irrational when it 
makes threats in other cases credible, for unless a threat is credible, 
it can be ignored. This principle applies even if the appellate court 
imposes sanctions on the objector under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 38 for filing a frivolous appeal, and the assumption that 
the appeal objectively has a zero probability of success surely implies 
that the appeal is frivolous.67 The effect of sanctions is to raise the 
expected cost of the appeal to the objector, but it does not change the 
rationality of incurring a cost. In effect, the professional objector 
invests in creating a reputation, thereby rendering her threats 
credible. Knowing that pursuit of an appeal with a zero probability of 
success is nevertheless rational, class counsel may deem the threat to 
appeal credible and pay off the objector so long as the appeal would 
impose costs on class counsel. The objector’s threat may be credible 
even if the objector never actually pursues an appeal. 
 By contrast, a threat to file a specious objection—or a threat not to 
withdraw one—that is not backed up by an explicit or implicit threat 
to file an appeal has little extortionate value. Class counsel are not 
entitled to fees at least until a settlement is approved. They will 
usually incur no cost of delay if the objection is presented to or 
remains before the district court. They may incur a marginal cost of 
responding to the objection if the objection raises issues that class 
counsel would not otherwise have addressed, but this cost is likely to 
be modest when the issues are legally trivial. And the essence of 
extortionate conduct as it relates to professional objectors is that 
their objections are legally insubstantial. 
 Notice, however, that a well-founded objection by itself may have 
bargaining value, but a bargain that keeps such an objection from the 
court achieves a socially harmful result. A district court in protecting 
the interests of the class has an obligation to consider all issues that 
bear upon the fairness of the settlement, even if an issue has not 
 66.  See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., No. 04-md-15863, 2011 WL 1102999, at *1 
n.1 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2011) (noting that objector’s attorney “is a frequent and professional 
objector”); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1361, 
2003 WL 22417252, at *2 n.3 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (noting that a settlement objector 
proposing to file a possibly frivolous appeal “appears to be a repeat objector in class action 
cases”). Indeed, courts sometimes use the term “serial objectors” as synonymous with 
professional objectors. See, e.g., In re Charles Schwab Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C 08—01510 
WHA, 2011 WL 633308, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011); Gemelas v. Dannon Co., No. 1:08 
CV 236, 2010 WL 3703811, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2010); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. 
Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 67.  See, e.g., Premier Pork, L.L.C. v. Westin Packaged Meats, Inc., 406 F. App’x 613, 
618 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991)) (“An 
appeal is frivolous if, applying an objective standard, it is wholly without merit.”). 
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been raised by an objector.68 But as a practical matter, the court 
might not see a particular issue unless it is pointed out by an 
objector. Indeed, a vexing problem posed by class action settlements 
is that, though the judge must approve them, the lawyers control her 
access to the information needed to determine their reasonableness.69
Class counsel might incur a substantial expected loss if an objector 
raises an otherwise overlooked issue, and that loss would create a 
bargaining space. The difference between the issue that underlies the 
extortion of the professional objector and the issue that may induce 
class counsel to bribe an objector is that the former has little legal 
merit and the latter substantial merit. 
 Interestingly, a threat not to withdraw an objection already filed 
has much less value, because the court will have already been alerted 
to the issue and is apt to consider it even if the objection is 
withdrawn; assuming the threat to maintain the objection is not 
coupled with the implicit expectation of appeal, class counsel have 
little to gain from paying to have it withdrawn. But in the 
circumstance of the latent issue, the issue is by hypothesis legally 
important. It should be considered. One could call a threat to notify 
the court of an unobserved and legally important weakness in a 
settlement a kind of blackmail, but it is not the kind that should be 
deterred. Rather, an agreement to pay off the potential objector in 
such circumstances would represent punishable collusion.70 To recap, 
professional objectors may engage in significant socially harmful 
extortion at the objection stage, but only if the prospect of an appeal 
lies in the background. 
 The upshot of this analysis is that a strategy of extortion—a 
strategy of threatening to appeal the approval of a class action 
settlement solely for the purpose of inducing class counsel to make a 
payment to avoid the appeal—is economically rational. It can be 
effective, and it can be profitable. This does not mean that every 
appeal is so motivated. An interloper may object to a settlement to 
 68.  See generally Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (noting that 
the absence or silence of class members toward a settlement does not relieve the judge of 
her duty to protect the class), aff’d, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970); 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:48, at 151 (4th ed. 2002) (“Despite a lack of 
opposition, the court should not lose sight of its responsibility to analyze independently and 
intelligently the settlement.”). 
 69.  See POSNER, supra note 44, at 786. 
 70.  See Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (“While the parties to a 
class action start out in an adversarial posture, once they reach the settlement stage, 
incentives have shifted and there is the danger of collusion.”); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-
up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting the dangers 
of “collusive settlements that primarily serve the interests of defendants—by granting 
expansive protection from law suits—and of plaintiffs’ counsel—by generating  
large fees gladly paid by defendants as a quid pro quo for finally disposing of many  
troublesome claims”). 
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increase the value to the class,71 and she might appeal because the 
district court errs in approving it. Indeed, an objector who provides 
some value to the class is entitled to compensation.72 It does mean, 
however, that economic theory supports the popular perception that 
some attorneys challenging class action settlements are professional 
objectors pursuing a strategy of extortion. The legal prerequisite for 
the strategy is Devlin v. Scardelletti.73 In that case, a nonnamed 
member of a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(1), who had refused to become a named representative, 
formally moved to intervene in the action some two weeks after class 
counsel and defendants filed a motion for preliminary approval of a 
settlement.74 The district court denied the motion to intervene as 
untimely, but it considered the individual’s objections anyway and 
approved the settlement.75 The objector appealed the denial of 
intervention and the settlement approval.76 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari “to resolve a disagreement among the circuits as to 
whether nonnamed class members who fail to properly intervene 
may bring an appeal of the approval of a settlement.”77
 71.  For example, one court explained:  
There are two ways . . . an intervenor might get paid. An intervenor 
might get paid by raising the value of a class action settlement and 
receiving a percentage of the increase in value or a fixed-payment for 
having improved the settlement; on the other hand, he might intervene 
and cause expensive delay in the hope of getting paid to go away. The 
former purpose for intervening would be entirely proper, while the 
latter would not. 
Vollmer, 350 F.3d at 660; see also In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., No. 00 Civ. 
6689(SAS), 2003 WL 22801724, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (citing White v. Auerbach, 
500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974)) (“[O]bjectors have a valuable and important role to 
perform in policing class action settlements.”). 
 72.  See, e.g., White, 500 F.2d at 828; In re AOL Time Warner ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 
8853(SWK), 2007 WL 4225486, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2007); Perez v. Asurion Corp., No. 
06-20734-CIV, 2007 WL 2591180, at *8 n.5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2007) (awarding objectors’ 
counsel expenses and fees for attendance at fairness hearing even though court did not find 
papers he filed “to be particularly helpful or to have conferred a benefit on the Class” but 
found that attendance “provided a safety check for the parties and the Court”). One court, 
though denying a fee award to objectors who “contributed nothing,” explained: “Objectors 
may add value to the [settlement] process by: (1) transforming the fairness hearing into a 
truly adversarial proceeding; (2) supplying the Court with both precedent and argument to 
gauge the reasonableness of the settlement and lead counsel’s fee request; and (3) 
preventing collusion between lead plaintiff and defendants.” In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. 
PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009) (citing In re Cardinal Health, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008)). 
 73.  536 U.S. 1 (2002). 
 74.  See id. at 5. 
 75. Id.
 76. Id. at 6. 
 77.  Id.
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 The Court reasoned that the issue did not turn on standing.78 As a 
member of the class, the petitioner had constitutional standing, and 
an appeal did not raise concerns normally addressed as a matter of 
prudential standing.79 Rather, the issue was whether such a class 
member is a “party” within the meaning of the principle “that ‘only 
parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may 
appeal an adverse judgment.’ ”80 The Court held that such a class 
member is a party.81 What the Court found “most important” was 
that nonnamed class members are “bound by the settlement.”82 The 
Court explained, “It is this feature of class action litigation that 
requires that class members be allowed to appeal the approval of a 
settlement when they have objected at the fairness hearing.”83
Because the case involved an action brought under Rule 23(b)(1), 
class members did not have the right to opt out of the settlement; by 
contrast, members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, which is the kind of action 
this Article addresses, do have that right.84 The Court observed:  
Particularly in light of the fact that petitioner had no ability to opt 
out of the settlement, appealing the approval of the settlement is 
petitioner’s only means of protecting himself from being bound by 
a disposition of his rights he finds unacceptable and that a 
reviewing court might find legally inadequate.85
Curiously, the Court was apparently aware that objectors sometimes 
file extortionate objections, for Justice Scalia alluded to the practice 
in his dissent.86 But the Court did not acknowledge the effect of its 
decision on the practice, view the practice as problematic, or believe 
that any exacerbating effect on the problem justified a different 
result. Even Justice Scalia seemed to be only partially aware of the 
nature of the problem, because his preferred resolution of the case 
would not have effectively prevented professional objector extortion.87
 That an objector is recognized as a party with a concomitant right 
to appeal is critical for the objector to pursue a strategy of extortion. 
 78. Id. at 6-7. 
 79. Id.
 80.  Id. at 7 (quoting Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam)). 
 81. Id. at 10. 
 82.  Id.
 83.  Id.
 84.  See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558-59 (2011) 
(noting the difference between “mandatory” classes certified under  Rules 23(b)(1) and (2) 
and opt-out classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 85.  Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10-11 (citation omitted).  
 86.  See id. at 22 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., 
Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973-74 n. 18 (E.D. Tex. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“noting ‘canned objections filed by professional objectors who seek out class actions to 
simply extract a fee by lodging generic, unhelpful protests’ ”). 
 87.  See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
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In theory, however, the right to appeal is otherwise limited in a way 
that defeats the strategy. The objection that serves as a necessary 
predicate for an appeal is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11, which provides that the attorney submitting any paper to the 
court certifies that “it is not being presented for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation.”88 A court may impose sanctions for 
violation of Rule 11. Extortion could comfortably be described as an 
improper purpose.89 But even if Rule 11 represents a legal constraint 
on the behavior of professional objectors, its positive impact depends 
on its application: an attorney or the court must initiate a Rule 11 
proceeding; the judge must find impropriety; and the judge must 
impose a sanction that is an effective deterrent. Professional 
objectors have an incentive, and usually the ability, to couch the 
objection in ways that disguise their motivation. Moreover, they may 
be undaunted by the prospect of modest sanctions, particularly given 
the probability that not all instances of extortionate objections will be 
found improper. And class counsel may prefer to make the payment 
than incur the cost of seeking Rule 11 sanctions. 
 If an extortionate demand does not violate any procedural rule, 
nothing in the Federal Rules now would prohibit class counsel from 
acceding to it so long as the payment does not come from funds that 
would otherwise be distributed to the class. A class member may 
appeal the approval of a settlement only if she objected to the 
settlement.90 Class counsel, therefore, could eliminate an appeal by 
paying the objector to withdraw an objection prior to the Rule 23 
hearing, which the court must conduct to determine whether the 
proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”91 Further, 
the parties seeking approval must identify “any agreement made in 
connection with the proposal,”92 and an agreement to pay off an 
objector would qualify. But the fairness standard relates to the 
interests of class members, not their lawyers, and the agreement-
disclosure requirement is an adjunct to the court’s fairness 
determination. An agreement to withdraw the objection in exchange 
for a payment that merely reduces class counsels’ fees and does not 
reduce compensation would not adversely affect the class. 
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 89.  See, e.g., Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that 
attorneys intervening to object to a settlement in the hope of causing expensive delay and 
getting paid to go away would be an improper purpose that would justify sanctions). 
 90.  See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10 (noting that nonnamed class members are parties to the 
case and thus have the right to appeal “when they have objected at the fairness hearing”). 
 91.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 92.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). 
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 If the agreement did reduce class compensation, it would implicate 
fairness. But eliminating the delay that would attend an appeal 
likely would benefit the class by speeding up execution of the 
settlement. If simply avoiding the harm an extortionate demand 
threatens to impose is not a cognizable benefit to the class, class 
counsel can tweak the settlement in a way that ostensibly provides 
some cognizable benefits to class members. In that case, the 
agreement to pay off the objector does not appear to be merely 
capitulation to an extortionate demand. Rule 23 also specifically 
requires the court’s approval for the withdrawal of any objection.93
But again, the point of this requirement is to ensure that the 
settlement is fair to the class. The court has an independent 
responsibility to consider any issue that bears upon the fairness of a 
settlement, whether the issue is raised in an objection or not.94 A 
court would have to consider the merits of the objection even if it 
permitted withdrawal. As long as the payoff and the attendant 
agreement to withdraw the objection either did not injure the class or 
arguably resulted in net gains to members of the class, the court 
could not sensibly refuse to approve the withdrawal. Alternatively, 
class counsel and the professional objector might strike a deal under 
which the objector does not withdraw her objection but does not 
appeal the settlement approval. In that event, nothing in Rule 23 
would even apply.   
 The fact that extortionate behavior is legally possible and 
economically rational does not mean that it is socially harmful. The 
welfare effects depend on the impact it has on resources and 
productive behavior. Imagine that lawyers bring a class action with a 
2% probability of a $1 billion judgment, hoping to induce the 
defendant to pay a settlement with a substantial component devoted 
to attorneys’ fees. The defendant, especially if it is risk averse, may 
prefer to settle the case rather than risk its reputation or even its 
corporate existence.95 If a professional objector comes forward 
threatening to appeal the settlement, any payoff to the objector will 
represent a private tax on the extortionate class action. Such a tax 
will make objecting less profitable, and because the activity is 
socially undesirable, the objector’s conduct may reduce the quantity 
of extortionate class actions at the margin. 
 93.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5) (“Any class member may object to the proposal if it 
requires court approval under this subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only 
with the court’s approval.”). 
 94. See supra note 68. 
 95.  See, e.g., CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (“Certification as a class action can coerce a defendant into settling on highly 
disadvantageous terms regardless of the merits of the suit.”). 
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 If all class actions were extortionate, professional objectors would 
be of little concern. Assuming their effect on class actions is 
disproportionate to their own costs, they would produce net positive 
value. But not all class actions are extortionate. The class action 
procedure may be indispensable in holding actors accountable for 
legal wrongs, where individual claims are too small to justify 
litigation.96 And though the relative proportions of valuable and 
extortionate class actions cannot be estimated with any confidence, 
presumably the proportion of valuable ones is substantial. The 
strategy of extortionate appeals or threats of appeals by professional 
objectors is invariant to the nature of the underlying class action. The 
strategy imposes a tax on valuable and extortionate class actions alike. 
 The tax on valuable class actions has undesirable consequences. 
Imagine that pirates are known to hijack ships off the coast of 
Somalia, holding crews for ransom. A boater might respond by 
navigating around the affected waters or by canceling the cruise. 
Either response represents a social cost. Class action lawyers are 
boaters. At the margin, productive class actions might not be 
brought, and if they are brought, they may be litigated and settled in 
ways that are needlessly costly, only to reduce the risk of hold-up. 
 If feasible, the law might prevent professional objectors from 
extorting payoffs in valuable class actions but not in extortionate 
class actions. But there is no obvious way to do so, and the second 
best policy response is to prevent professional objector extortion 
entirely. The reason is not so much based on an empirical hunch that 
the value of desirable class actions outweighs the value of 
extortionate ones. Rather, extortionate class actions can be addressed 
in ways that are more direct and more effective than by exposing 
them to pirates.   
III.   METHODS OF SUPPRESSING PROFESSIONAL OBJECTORS
 The practical policy objective is not to confine professional 
objectors to the realm of extortionate class actions, but to suppress 
them altogether. But a real policy challenge exists in devising a 
method to deter extortion without deterring legitimate appeals. 
Agency problems plague class action litigation. The principals are the 
members of the class, but their stakes in the outcome of the litigation 
are usually too small to give them an incentive to monitor the 
decisions of class counsel. Class counsel have fiduciary obligations to 
the class,97 but they have an economic interest in maximizing their 
 96.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 44, at 785; Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 1383-
89; Macey & Miller, supra note 44, at 8-9. 
 97.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the class.”). 
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fees.98 They benefit as the proportion devoted to attorneys’ fees of any 
given settlement grows. Defendants are indifferent to the division of 
settlement proceeds between class members and class counsel.  
Their interest is simply in minimizing the expected cost of the  
total settlement.99
 Defendants, in fact, prefer a settlement that maximizes class 
counsel’s share of the settlement fund. Suppose class counsel would 
be willing to settle a class action if they receive $5 million in fees, and 
they are indifferent to whether the class receives $10 million or $20
million. The defendant much prefers a total settlement of $15 
million, representing a share for class counsel of 33%, to a total 
settlement of $25 million, representing a share for class counsel of 
20%. The interests of defendants and class counsel to this extent 
align, and they are adverse to the interest of class members.100
 Because of the potential that a settlement will short-change the 
class, the district court has an obligation to protect the interests of 
class members. Some circuit courts have observed that “the district 
court acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of 
absent class members.”101 The district court must determine that the 
settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,”102 and in making that 
determination it must find that any attorneys’ fees provided for in 
the settlement are reasonable.103 The court must take into account 
 98.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(noting a district court’s “duty to protect the members of a class in class action litigation 
from lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of their professional and fiduciary 
obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class”); David L. 
Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 958-60 
(1998); Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 9, at 384-93.  
 99.  See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]his court has recognized that ‘a defendant is interested 
only in disposing of the total claim asserted against it; . . . the allocation between the class 
payment and the attorneys’ fees is of little or no interest to the defense.’ ”(quoting Prandini 
v. Nat’l Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977))). 
 100.  See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 1390-91. 
 101.  Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975); see also 
Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We and other 
courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class 
action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the 
law requires of fiduciaries.”); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001);
In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 785; Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 
1987); Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983); Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 
1306, 1327-30 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 102.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 103.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee notes to 
2003 Amendments, ¶ 3 (“Whether or not there are formal objections, the court must 
determine whether a fee award is justified and, if so, set a reasonable fee.”); In re Katrina 
Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have repeatedly held that a 
district court abuses its discretion if it approves a class action settlement without 
determining that any attorneys’ fees claimed as part of the settlement are reasonable and 
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any issues bearing upon the fairness of the settlement.104 In theory, 
then, class members are protected by the district court, regardless of 
whether anyone objects to the settlement. In practice, though, the 
district court may not have the information necessary to recognize an 
infirmity in the settlement, and that information may be provided  
by objectors.105
 The structure of class action litigation, therefore, imposes 
fiduciary obligations on class counsel to protect the interests of the 
entire class. Because their economic self-interest diverges from the 
interests of class members, however, the district court is given a 
supervisory responsibility to ensure that class counsel discharge 
their obligations and, ultimately, that any settlement serves the 
interests of the class. But the court may need independently provided 
information to discharge its responsibility, and that information may 
come from objectors. Further, even an informed, well-meaning judge 
will make mistakes, and the method of error correction used in the 
United States legal system (and many others) is the appeals process. 
The policy objective, therefore, is to obtain the benefits of legitimate 
objections and appeals while avoiding the costs of extortionate ones. 
The optimal approach is that which produces the greatest net value. 
A number of methods are possible.  
A.   Prohibit Appeal 
 If the right to appeal class action settlements were limited to 
named parties, professional objectors would virtually disappear. 
Objectors might still challenge settlements in fairness hearings solely 
to be paid off, but the licit extortion value of such a challenge would 
be minimal. The rule, however, would have an adverse impact on 
legitimate objectors: they would lose access to the appellate process 
as an error correction device. Access to that process is particularly 
valuable when class members have no other way to escape the effects 
of an erroneous judgment. Devlin, for example, was a case brought 
under Rule 23(b)(1), and under that provision, nonnamed class 
members are bound by the settlement and have no ability to opt out 
that the settlement itself is reasonable in light of those fees.”); Strong v. BellSouth 
Telecomms., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1998); Piambino, 610 F.2d at 1328. 
104. See, e.g., Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 279-80 (noting that district courts must “exercise 
the highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions” and 
reversing approval because “the judge did not give the issue of the settlement’s adequacy 
the care it deserved”). 
 105.  Courts will typically consider the merits of objections even if they believe the 
objections are lodged by professional objectors. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft 
Litig., No. 09-MD-02036-JKL, 2011 WL 5873389, at *24 n.30 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2011) 
(noting that the court had considered the objections of professional objectors on the merits 
and rejected them). 
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of it.106 One could argue that the right to appeal need not be 
recognized in Rule 23(b)(3) cases because in these, nonnamed class 
members have another method of avoiding the effects of an erroneous 
judgment: they can opt out.107 They may opt out of the class when 
they receive notice of the class action, and even if they first receive 
notice of class certification before a tentative settlement is reached, 
they will receive a second notice afterward and may be given another 
chance to opt out of the action. Devlin, in fact, could be read to 
support this view. The Court emphasized that what was “most 
important” to its decision was that nonnamed class members would 
be “bound by the settlement.”108 They had “no ability to opt out of the 
settlement,” and so “appealing the approval of the settlement is 
petitioner’s only means of protecting himself from being bound by a 
disposition of his rights he finds unacceptable and that a reviewing 
court might find legally inadequate.”109 This is the “feature of class 
action litigation that requires that class members be allowed to 
appeal the approval of a settlement.”110 One court has so read Devlin
and has held that under similar state class action rules the right of 
nonnamed class members to appeal settlements is confined to those 
in mandatory classes.111
 Most courts that have addressed the question, however, have read 
Devlin to extend to all class actions,112 and we believe that 
recognizing a right to appeal in opt-out cases is the correct approach. 
As a legal matter, the logic of Devlin leads to the recognition of a 
broad right, even if some language in the opinion suggests a narrow 
holding.113 The decision is based on the principle that an objecting 
106. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 107.  See, e.g., Barnhorst, supra note 19, at 109 (“[F]ailure to opt out of a class, either 
prior to settlement or at the settlement stage, should, in the interests of efficiency and 
equity, foreclose the opportunity to appeal a district court’s settlement approval.”). 
 108.  Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002). For this reason, objectors who claim 
they were wrongly excluded from a class are not parties to the action and may not appeal. 
See AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 361 F.3d 1305, 1309-10 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 109.  Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10-11 (emphasis added). 
 110.  Id. at 10. 
 111.  See Ballard v. Advance America, 79 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Ark. 2002); see also In re 
Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 302 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2002) (questioning 
“whether Devlin’s holding applies to opt-out class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3)” and 
opining that “the limited reading of Devlin has considerable merit”). 
 112.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Chain Drug Stores v. New England Carpenters Health 
Benefits Fund, 582 F.3d 30, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he weight of authority holds that 
Devlin applies to all class actions.”); Fidel v. Farley, 534 F.3d 508, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 572 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 113.  Another way in which Devlin might be given narrow scope is to focus on the 
Court’s language that “petitioner will only be allowed to appeal that aspect of the District 
Court’s order that affects him—the District Court’s decision to disregard his objections.” 
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9. One court relied on this passage to conclude that an objector was 
permitted to appeal only to the extent the judgment approving the settlement “affects him 
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member of a class must have a realistic opportunity to avoid the 
binding effect of a settlement, at least until the settlement has been 
reviewed by an appellate court. Opting out of a class action is usually 
not a viable alternative to class resolution of a claim, because the 
claimant will not typically have a practical opportunity to pursue the 
claim outside of the certified class.114 The realistic choices the 
disgruntled class member faces ordinarily are either to accept a 
settlement that has not been ratified by the appellate court or to 
forgo her claim. If absent members of a non-opt-out class have a right 
to appeal, so must those of an opt-out class. 
 The economic logic of class action appeals leads to the same 
conclusion. A rule that prohibited appeals by nonnamed members of 
opt-out classes would virtually eliminate professional objectors, but it 
would also insulate settlements agreeable to counsel for all named 
parties and the district court from appellate review. Importantly, this 
does not mean that a settlement is insulated from objection, 
legitimate or otherwise. Legitimate objections brought before the 
district court may be critical in providing the court information 
needed to assess the adequacy of the settlement. A bar to appeal 
would not impede them in any way, though for that matter a right of 
appeal does not increase the information brought forward by objectors. 
Appellate courts review the legal significance of information. 
 Rather, the relevant social loss is the cost of error in district court 
approvals that would be reversed on appeal. That error cost is a 
function of the stakes in the litigation, and they will vary greatly. 
But it is also a function of the district court’s error rate and the 
appellate court’s reversal rate, and something can be said about 
them. The appellate process is premised on the assumption that 
appellate court decisions are more accurate than district court 
decisions, in part because appellate decisions are the product of 
multiple judges whereas lower court decisions represent a single 
judge’s decision, and in part because appellate courts are perceived to 
personally” and not “on behalf of the entire [c]lass.” Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 
No. 91-0986-CIV, 2006 WL 1132371, at *17 n.13, 18 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2006). The court 
seemed to believe that such a rule would foreclose the possibility of a decision on appeal 
that affected more than the individual interests of the objector. But objections if successful 
on appeal would typically result in a benefit to at least a group of class members including 
the objector, and so the appeal would necessarily be undertaken on behalf of multiple class 
members, with a resolution affecting potentially the entire class. As another court 
observed, “[W]e can see no practical way to separate Objectors’ individual interests from 
those of the other class members.” Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 
1183 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002).    
 114. One alternative to class litigation that might prove viable is an action in small 
claims court, an alternative that has achieved some recent success. See Carolyn Whetzel & 
Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Opt Out’s Use of Social Media Against Honda in Small Claim Win 
Possible “Game Changer,” CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP.  (Feb. 10, 2012). 
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be of higher decisionmaking quality than trial courts. Indeed, an 
economic justification of the appellate process is that maintaining 
disparate quality between court levels is a more efficient method of 
achieving a desired level of accuracy than investing in higher quality 
at the lower court level.115 District courts, therefore, are expected to 
make mistakes, and that is true for class action settlement approvals 
as well as for every other kind of decision they make. Further, 
appellate courts are expected to make fewer mistakes, correcting 
some of the mistakes made below and not reversing too many 
decisions that were correct. What some believe, however, is that the 
error rate for district court approval of settlement agreements is 
higher than the average for all of their decisions, because district 
judges are biased in favor of ending litigation; we return to this issue 
later.116 For now, we assume that district courts err in approving 
settlements more frequently than they err in other decisions, using 
as a definition of error a deviation from the objectively correct result, 
or the result that would be reached with perfect information. 
 The error correction rate, or reversal rate, is a function of the 
appellate court’s scope of review. As appellate review becomes more 
deferential, the reversal rate declines, and review of class action 
settlements are highly deferential. As a technical matter, settlement 
approvals are subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard, and that 
standard accords substantial deference to the district court.117 An 
appellate court may well conclude that it would not have approved 
the settlement but that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in approving it. Further, many of the issues that might be raised in 
an appeal of a settlement, such as the effort of class counsel as it 
affects the magnitude of attorneys’ fees, are the kind of issues that 
district courts have a comparative advantage in resolving, which is, 
of course, why the law imposes a deferential standard of review. 
Appellate courts are understandably reluctant to overturn decisions 
that the district court was in a better position to make. Finally, 
courts recognize a strong public interest in settling class action 
litigation,118 a recognition that cuts in favor of deferential review. For 
 115.  See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process As a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 387 (1995). 
 116.  See infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 117.  See, e.g., In re Pet Food Prods. Liability Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation 
omitted)) (“We review the decision of the District Court to . . . approve [a] settlement under 
an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion may be found where the district 
court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or 
an improper application of law to fact.”). 
 118.  See, e.g., id. at 351 (“We reaffirm the ‘overriding public interest in settling class 
action litigation.’ ” (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium, 391 F.3d at 535)). 
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all of these reasons, a modest number of errors made by district 
courts in approving settlements are likely to be corrected on appeal. 
 The implication of this analysis is that prohibiting appeals by 
nonrepresentatives of settlements in opt-out cases would probably 
not impose especially high social costs resulting from erroneous 
approvals. Nevertheless, we prefer an appeal bond procedure because 
it is likely to result in marginally lower social costs yet suppress 
extortionate conduct nearly as effectively while imposing modest 
additional administrative costs.  
B.   Require Intervention 
 The United States in Devlin argued that nonnamed class members 
should be required to intervene in the district court to have the right 
to appeal a judgment approving a settlement.119 Justice Scalia, for 
himself and two other members of the Court, agreed.120 Justice Scalia 
was primarily concerned with maintaining what he believed to be a 
clear and settled rule that a nonnamed member of a class in a class 
action is not a “ ‘party’ to the judgment approving the class 
settlement.”121 But he agreed with the government that requiring 
objectors to intervene before appealing would also “enable district 
courts ‘to perform an important screening function.’ ”122 The 
government and dissenting justices recognized that class members 
objecting to a settlement would almost always be entitled to 
intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, even 
after the class judgment has been entered.123 Given that right, the 
Court reasoned, little would be gained by requiring intervention.124
The government and the dissenting justices argued that district 
judges could deny intervention and thus preclude appeal of the 
settlement judgment in a few situations, three of which are 
potentially relevant to the conduct of professional objectors: (1) 
“where the objector is not actually a member of the settlement class 
or is otherwise not entitled to relief from the settlement”; (2) where 
 119.  See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 11. 
 120.  See id. at 23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 121.  Id. at 15. Justice Scalia observed that “avoiding the reduction to indeterminacy of 
the hitherto clear rule regarding who is a party is ‘value’ enough” to require intervention to 
appeal. Id. at 21. 
 122.  Id. (quoting Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 21, Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 01-417)). 
 123. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 12 (majority opinion), 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 124.  See id. at 12-13 (majority opinion). 
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an objector seeks to appeal even though her objection was successful; 
and (3) where the objection at the fairness hearing was untimely.125
 As we have explained, what is critical in pursuing an extortionate 
strategy is that the professional objector delay implementation of the 
settlement for the pendency of an appeal. A professional objector can 
pursue such a strategy even if she does not represent a class member 
entitled to relief, represents a class member whose objection has been 
sustained and addressed in the settlement, or filed an untimely 
objection, so long as she can file an appeal however groundless and 
interrupt the execution of the settlement. 
 The Court believed that the situations in which an intervention 
requirement would screen out appeals would arise infrequently.126
The Court thought that individuals who are not entitled to relief but 
object anyway are irrational and remain irrational if they appeal; 
individuals who successfully object are rational and are unlikely to 
appeal irrationally.127 The infrequent instances of irrational appeals, 
the Court concluded, can be addressed at the appellate level.128
 Justice Scalia disputed the Court’s “sunny surmise that the 
appeals will be few.”129 He recognized that an objection and appeal 
might be irrational in substance even though the conduct of making 
the objection and filing the appeal is rational, citing a case involving 
professional objectors.130 Justice Scalia seemed to understand, 
therefore, that the strategy of extortion is viable and that one cannot 
assume that it will be pursued infrequently. But requiring 
intervention will not effectively squelch it. Professional objectors can 
locate actual class members, file meritless and unsuccessful 
objections on their behalf, request intervention as of right, and 
appeal the judgment approving the settlement. That path of extortion 
is not unlikely; indeed, it seems to be the common path traveled by 
professional objectors.131 Justice Scalia, having astutely recognized 
the potential for extortion, advocates a rule that would do little to 
prevent it, though perhaps more than does the approach adopted by 
the Court. In the end, requiring intervention as a prerequisite to 
 125.  Id. at 13. The government and the dissenting justices also noted that the 
screening function would be valuable where there is a need to consolidate duplicative 
appeals. See id.; id. at 21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 126.  See id. at 13-14 (majority opinion). 
 127.  See id. at 13. 
 128. Id.
 129.  See id. at 22 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130.  See id.
 131.  Moreover, if an objector were denied intervention, she might appeal that decision. 
The intervention requirement would be useless in deterring extortion unless 
implementation of the settlement goes forward while the appeal is pending or the appeal 
can be resolved quickly.  
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appeal would not stifle legitimate objectors, but it would not 
effectively stifle professional objectors either. 
C.   Impose Sanctions 
 One approach to professional objectors is to impose sanctions on 
them for extortionate behavior.132 Because the kind of extortion that 
is most dangerous involves a meritless objection followed by a 
groundless appeal, the district court or the appellate court could 
potentially impose sanctions or instigate the imposition of sanctions 
by other legal authorities. Sanctions would have to be calibrated to 
deter objectionable conduct without deterring desirable conduct.133
And discovery, either initiated by a court or opposing attorneys, 
might be necessary to determine whether improper conduct 
occurred.134 Though courts have imposed sanctions on professional 
objectors, they have not done so often, despite frequently identifying 
professional objectors as the source of objections. There are good 
reasons for the infrequency of sanction orders, and the sanction 
approach is not likely to be effective. 
 To begin with, a district court could impose or instigate the 
imposition of sanctions for conduct leading up to the filing of an 
objection. For example, the district court might find, likely after 
 132.  See, e.g., Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), 
No. CIV.A. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2000) (suggesting that the 
imposition of sanctions by the appellate court for the filing of a frivolous appeal is an 
adequate remedy for an appeal filed solely as an attempt to leverage a settlement). 
 133.  Sanctions are typically thought of as monetary penalties or professional 
disciplinary actions, but they can more broadly be understood in this context as any 
penalty imposed by a court. In this sense, a sanction might be to deem a frivolous objection 
waived or withdrawn. Unless such a sanction were considered unappealable, it would not 
do much to curtail extortionate objections. In one case, the parties requested the court to 
impose objection procedures that entailed the following: setting a deadline for written 
notice of objection and requiring that the notice include proof of class membership, specific 
objections, and grounds for objection; precluding those who do not provide such a notice 
from appearing at the settlement hearing and deeming their objections waived; and 
permitting class or defense counsel to conduct discovery related to the objection. See 
Trombley v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 08-cv-456-JD, 2011 WL 3740488, at *5 (D.R.I. Aug. 24, 
2011). The court set a deadline and required written submissions, but it did not order that 
noncompliant objections be deemed waived or permit discovery. See id. at *5-6. The court 
suggested that the sanction for noncompliance would be that the court would not consider 
the objection. See id. at *6.  
 134.  See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. CV-07-5944-SC, 2012 
WL 1319881, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) (granting class counsel’s motion to compel 
discovery from class member objector to explore inter alia his relationship with a reputed 
professional objector); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294-95 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that court ordered objectors’ attorneys to answer questions seeking 
to determine whether they have a “practice of objecting to class action settlements for the 
purpose of securing a settlement from class counsel”). Cf. Trombley, 2011 WL 3740488, at 
*5-6 (noting that class and defense counsel requested that they be “entitled to depose the 
objector and to seek discovery related to the objection” but denying the request). 
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discovery, that an attorney violated ethical obligations by soliciting 
class members to object to a settlement135 or entering into fee 
arrangements with them,136 and it might impose sanctions or refer 
the attorney to disciplinary authorities.137 The court might identify 
ethical violations in the overtures a professional objector makes to 
class counsel, such as a suggestion that the objector will withdraw an 
appeal in exchange for a donation to a charity in which the objector is 
financially interested.138 But professional objectors need not engage 
in unethical conduct of this sort. Alternatively, the court might 
impose sanctions for the act of filing or the content of an objection. 
For example, the judge might find that the professional objector 
purported to represent a class member who was not in fact a member 
of the class, a possibility recognized in Devlin.139 In such a case, the 
court might impose sanctions for violation of Rule 11, for the court 
might deem the objection to have been filed for an “improper purpose, 
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase 
the cost of litigation”140 or to contain an implicit or explicit “factual 
contention[]”—that the identified objector is a member of the class—
lacking “evidentiary support.”141 Once again, however, professional 
objectors need not represent phantom class members. 
 Similarly, the court might find that a meritless objection filed on 
behalf of an actual class member violates Rule 11. A court may 
impose sanctions for a frivolous filing or for a nonfrivolous filing 
 135.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2006). 
 136.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2007). 
 137.  District courts have two primary statutory bases for the imposition of sanctions, 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The latter provides 
that an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, 
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006). 
The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is unquestionably to deter misconduct, whereas the 
purpose of § 1927 sanctions may be both deterrence and compensation. See Lamboy-Ortiz 
v. Ortiz-Vélez, 630 F.3d 228, 247 (1st Cir. 2010). District courts also have inherent 
equitable powers to impose sanctions for vexatious conduct. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-
5 (1973) (“[I]t is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful 
party when his opponent has acted ‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons.’ ” (quoting 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 54.77(2), at 1709 (2d ed. 1972))). For 
expositional simplicity, we focus on Rule 11, but the specific source of sanctions imposed on 
professional objectors is not especially important. 
 138.  See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 294 (noting that in an 
unrelated case, a pro se objector “created a nonprofit organization and entered into a 
stipulation pursuant to which he withdrew his objection to a $3.2 billion class settlement in 
exchange for a $300,000 donation to his organization, plus an additional $40,000 payment 
to himself and his then-counsel”).   
 139.  See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 13 (2002) (recognizing possibility that 
appeal is brought on behalf of someone who is not a member of the settlement class but 
finding it insufficient to require nonnamed class members to intervene as a precondition  
to appeal). 
 140. F. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). 
 141.  F. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
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made for an improper purpose, such as extortion.142 Courts have been 
reluctant to conclude that objections are so devoid of merit as to be 
frivolous, given that boilerplate arguments asserting deficiencies in a 
class action settlement based on elastic legal standards cannot 
typically be dismissed out of hand.143 Courts are often willing to 
assert that objectors are professionals, but ascribing extortionate 
motives to them when motive is insusceptible of conclusive proof is 
another matter.144 Judges tend to be circumspect, and they shy away 
from impugning motives and imposing consequences without 
substantial evidence. If they impose sanctions without firm support, 
they risk reversal,145 albeit under a deferential standard of review.146
 To the extent the infrequency of sanctions imposed by district 
courts is a product of unduly strict requirements embodied in Rule 
11, those requirements could be loosened, and sanctions might 
become an effective deterrent. But there is a structural reason why 
district courts are not likely to suppress extortion through sanctions, 
however direct that method might seem. The district court’s 
obligations to the class push the court to consider all objections to a 
settlement, whether substantial or baseless. The issue of whether 
objectors engaged in sanctionable conduct is a collateral matter that 
will complicate and likely prolong the litigation. From the standpoint 
of the judge, class counsel and defendants receive what they want, an 
approved settlement. They apparently have little to gain from an 
order imposing sanctions, and yet that order will take the court’s 
 142.  See Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 143.  See, e.g., Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035(HB), 2011 WL 
5873383, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (refusing to find conduct of attorneys to have been 
undertaken in bad faith or vexatious and observing that “[m]erely characterizing some of 
the attorneys as ‘professional objectors’ without specifying what, exactly, they have done 
that is either in bad faith or vexatious, is not enough”); Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., 
No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *8 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (“While the 
Court reaches no conclusion as to frivolousness and bad faith . . . , the Court would be hard 
pressed to say that all of the objections were patently frivolous.”). 
 144.  Sometimes courts are even reluctant to use the term “professional objector.” In In 
re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 
786513, at *1-2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010), the court refused to adopt class counsel’s “pejorative 
characterization” of objectors’ attorneys as “ ‘professional objectors’ who have a long record 
of extorting payment from class counsel by filing frivolous appeals.” But it nevertheless 
found that objectors’ attorneys “have a documented history of filing notices of appeal from 
orders approving other class action settlements, and thereafter dismissing said appeals 
when they and their clients were compensated by the settling class or counsel for the 
settling class” and that the appeals taken in the instant case “are frivolous and are 
tantamount to a stay of the [j]udgment” approving the settlement. Id.
 145.  See Vollmer, 350 F.3d at 663 (vacating the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on 
purported professional objectors where record did not demonstrate that objections were 
frivolous or filed for extortionate purpose).  
 146.  See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (“[A]n appellate 
court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district 
court’s Rule 11 determination.”). 
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time and effort. Of course, extortionate behavior can interrupt 
implementation of the settlement, injuring the class, class counsel, 
and the defendants. Further, extortionate behavior in a case imposes 
a negative externality, making extortion more likely in other cases 
and undermining the integrity of the legal system. A court could find 
that the internal and external benefits of pursuing the collateral 
matter of the professional objector’s behavior are worth the costs. But 
our experience suggests that courts generally take a narrow view of 
the interests at stake, and they are not likely to embrace an 
aggressive role in policing the conduct of professional objectors. If 
district courts do not now consistently use sanctions to deter 
objectionable behavior, it is difficult to imagine what mechanism 
could be used to induce them to act differently. 
 Appellate courts can impose sanctions for frivolous appeals,147 and 
an “appeal is frivolous if, applying an objective standard, it is wholly 
without merit.”148 The hallmark of a professional objector’s appeal is 
its lack of substantive merit. Nevertheless, courts are circumspect in 
declaring appeals frivolous.149 One court explained that 
circumspection is appropriate “so that novel theories will not be 
chilled and litigants advancing any claim or defense which has 
colorable support under existing law or reasonable extensions thereof 
will not be deterred.”150 Given the nature of the legal standards at 
issue in class action settlements, circumspect appellate courts will 
hesitate to conclude that, objectively speaking, a professional 
objector’s arguments lack colorable support, regardless of the 
objector’s extortionate motive. Moreover, professional objectors can 
withdraw their appeals before resolution. Though appellate courts 
 147.  See FED. R. APP. P. 38.  
 148.  Premier Pork, L.L.C. v. Westin Packaged Meats, Inc., 406 F. App’x 613, 618 (3d 
Cir. 2011). See also Golden v. Helen Sigman & Assocs., 611 F.3d 356, 366-67 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“We have held that an appeal qualifies as frivolous if either ‘the result is obvious’ or ‘the 
appellant’s argument is wholly without merit.’ ” (quoting Wiese v. Cmty. Bank of Cent. 
Wis., 552 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2009))); NLRB v. Unbelievable, Inc., 71 F.3d 1434, 1441 
(9th Cir. 1995) (same); Bonfiglio v. Nugent, 986 F.2d 1391, 1393 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that an appeal is frivolous if it is “utterly devoid of merit”); Braley v. Campbell, 832  
F.2d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987) (“An appeal is frivolous when the result is obvious, or  
the appellant’s arguments of error are wholly without merit.”) (internal quotation  
marks omitted). 
 149.  See, e.g., Premier Pork, 406 F. App’x at 618 (“[W]e . . . exercise caution in 
classifying appeals as frivolous . . . .”); Sheldon v. Khanal, 396 F. App’x 737, 740 (2d Cir. 
2010) (holding that conduct in an appeal had not “yet reached the sanctionable level” even 
though conduct during the course of the “litigation has been, on the whole, highly 
troubling” and the institution of a new suit during the pendency of the appeal was 
“particularly questionable”); Golden, 611 F.3d at 367 (declining to impose sanctions even 
though appellant “raised a good number of frivolous points on appeal” where he also raised 
“a number of issues that could not be dismissed out of hand” and describing its decision as 
“a closer call than it should be”).  
 150.  Hilmon Co. (V.I.) v. Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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presumably would retain jurisdiction to impose sanctions under 
Appellate Rule 38,151 it is nearly inconceivable that they would 
pursue sanctions sua sponte. They are busy, and most likely no judge 
would even have been assigned the appeal at the time it was 
withdrawn.152 Class counsel who paid professional objectors to 
withdraw would not seek sanctions, and those who successfully 
resisted attempted extortion would be sorely tempted to drop the 
matter as well. 
 Assuming that district or appellate courts would impose sanctions, 
they would have to determine the magnitude. That is not an easy 
task. An optimal sanction will deter extortionate behavior without 
deterring desirable behavior. Rule 11 limits a sanction “to what 
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly situated.”153 That constraint would appear loose 
enough to allow a district court to impose an adequate sanction to 
deter extortionate behavior, but it does not provide a guide for 
determining the sanction within the upper bound. A district court 
would have to set a sanction bearing some relationship to the 
objectionable conduct that occurred in proceedings before the district 
court, though it can be set high enough to deter repetition or similar 
conduct by others. But a critical aspect of professional objector 
activity is the appeal, and a sanction focused on conduct prior to the 
appeal would almost certainly be inadequate. Expanding the focus of 
conduct would require a rule change. 
 Federal Appellate Rule 38 permits a court of appeal to “award just 
damages and single or double costs to the appellee” as a sanction for 
a frivolous appeal.154 At a minimum, an appropriate sanction would 
have to take into account the probability that any sanction would be 
imposed. Professional objectors may withdraw their appeals, and as 
explained above, appellate courts are not likely to impose sanctions 
in those cases. An appropriate adjustment is to multiply the damages 
caused by the objector by the reciprocal of the probability that a 
sanction will be imposed, sometimes called the enforcement error.155
That may result in a very high number, and appellate courts might 
be unwilling to impose such a sanction. That hesitancy, indeed, may 
 151.  See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 398 (holding that voluntary dismissal of a 
complaint does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to impose sanctions under  
Rule 11). 
 152.  This fact distinguishes a district court after a complaint is withdrawn from an 
appellate court after an appeal is withdrawn. A district judge is invested in a case to an 
extent that an appellate judge is not.  
 153.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). 
 154.  FED. R. APP. P. 38. 
 155. See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 62, at 260; POSNER, supra note 44,  
at 277. 
2012]  CLASS ACTION PROFESSIONAL OBJECTORS 901
be economically justified, for the possibility that the court will 
mistake a legitimate but groundless appeal for the frivolous appeal of 
a professional objector implies that the sanction will deter desirable 
behavior. The appropriate sanction could be reduced by increasing 
the probability of imposition, and that might be accomplished by 
allowing the district court to impose a sanction calculated to include 
the damages caused by an appeal. The sanctionable conduct would 
then include the act of filing an appeal, which requires the filing of a 
notice of appeal in the district court, and district courts could 
theoretically impose sanctions in all cases, lowering the damage 
multiple to one. But district courts are not now permitted to impose 
sanctions under Rule 11 for conduct relating directly to an appeal,156
and anyway, they are not likely to impose sanctions in all cases for 
the reasons discussed above. More importantly, as repeat players, 
professional objectors may invest in creating a reputation. A sanction 
calculated on the basis of damages caused in an individual case 
adjusted to account for enforcement error might not deter the 
conduct. The sanction affects the size of the investment, but the 
investment may nevertheless be rational. 
 In any event, an appropriate sanction would relate to the damages 
done by the objectionable behavior. That benchmark is also the 
correct one in setting an appeal bond, a topic we explore below. At 
heart, the difference between an optimal sanction for a frivolous 
appeal in this context and the requirement of an optimal appeal bond 
is the difference between an ex post incentive and an ex ante one. 
Both will be based on the costs imposed on others by the appeal.  
The ex ante incentive is preferable, however, because it is cheaper  
to administer. 
 In theory, therefore, sanctions could be set that adequately deter 
extortionate behavior and do not deter legitimate objections. But a 
sanction approach would involve high administrative costs, if it could 
be implemented at all. 
D.   Expedite Appeals 
 Nearly every federal appellate court has procedures to expedite 
appeals, by permitting motions for summary disposition and 
expedited review.157 Because the cost of extortionate behavior is a 
 156.  See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405-09 (holding that a district court may not, 
pursuant to Rule 11, order an appellant to reimburse the appellee for attorneys’ fees 
incurred on appeal). 
 157.  See 1ST CIR. R. 27.0(c) (summary disposition); 2D CIR. R. 27.1(d) (emergency 
motions); 3D CIR. R. 4.1 (motions to expedite); 3D CIR. R. 27.4 (motion for summary action); 
4TH CIR. R. 27(f) (motions for summary disposition); 5TH CIR. R. 27.5 (motions to expedite 
appeal); 6TH CIR. R. 27(e) (motion to expedite appeal); 7TH CIR. I.O.P. 1(c)(7) (recognizing 
motion to expedite briefing); 9TH CIR. R. 3-6 (summary disposition of civil appeals); 9TH 
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function of delay in implementing the settlement, speeding up the 
resolution of a professional objector’s appeal is a possible solution.158
But in most cases, quick appellate resolution is impractical, and in 
many it is unwise. 
 Summary disposition is appropriate when the papers filed in the 
appellate court clearly show that no substantial legal question is 
presented.159 Normally the standard can be satisfied only when the 
appeal can be resolved by the straightforward application of a 
specific, unambiguous legal standard. Some appeals by professional 
objectors might satisfy the standard for summary disposition. For 
example, if the briefs demonstrate that the professional objector is 
appealing on behalf of a person who is not a member of the class, 
summary disposition is appropriate, for the court may easily 
determine that the objector’s client is not a party to the action. But 
most appeals, even if frivolous, will not be so easily resolved. The 
underlying legal standard is spongy, such as that attorneys’ fees 
must be reasonable, and the application of the standard requires 
judgment. True, the appellate court’s obligation is merely to 
determine whether the district judge abused her discretion in 
determining that the fee award is reasonable, and that determination 
may be easier to make than the initial determination of 
reasonableness. But even taking into account the scope of review, few 
appeals will present no substantial legal question. 
 Expedited proceedings are designed for matters of such 
importance that they deserve to be resolved before other pending 
appeals. There must be an “exceptional reason that warrants 
expedition.”160 However significant the problem of professional 
objector extortion may be, one can hardly say that the stakes 
involved trump those presented by the range of other cases resolved 
CIR. R. 27-3(b) (urgent motions); 10TH CIR. R. 27.2 (summary disposition); 11TH CIR. R. 27-
1(d)(9) (motion to expedite appeals); D.C. CIR. R. 27(f) (requests for expeditious 
consideration); D.C. CIR. R. 27(g) (dispositive motions). 
 158.  See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 961 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(suggesting that appellate courts can deter frivolous appeals by disposing of them at the 
outset through a screening process or by granting an appellee’s motion to dismiss); In re
Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The traditional 
countermeasure for an appeal thought to be frivolous is a motion in the appellate court to 
dismiss . . . .”); Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, 
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (noting that settling parties can respond to a frivolous 
appeal by moving “to dismiss or expedite the appeal”); Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In 
re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CIV.A. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 6, 2000) (observing that “an immediate motion to dismiss filed in the court of appeals” 
is one method that can adequately protect an appellee against frivolous appeals). 
 159.  See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 27.0(c) (“At any time . . . the court may dismiss the appeal . . . 
if it shall clearly appear that no substantial question is presented.”); 3D CIR. R. 27.4(a) (“A 
party may move for summary action affirming . . . a judgment . . . alleging that no 
substantial question is presented . . . .”). 
 160.  3D CIR. R. 4.1. 
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by federal appellate courts. To resolve professional objector appeals 
out of turn would reduce social welfare by delaying the resolution of 
more pressing cases, even recognizing that the time needed to 
dispose of the appeal would be relatively short. Indeed, to give 
priority to frivolous appeals would be ironic. 
E.   Use Quick-Pay Provisions 
 A recent initiative in the campaign against professional objectors 
is the use of quick-pay provisions in class action settlement 
agreements.161 These provisions stipulate that class counsel will 
receive attorneys’ fees when the settlement is approved by the 
district court, subject to refund if the settlement is later set aside.162
In conventional class action settlements by contrast, defendants are 
not obligated to pay attorneys’ fees until approval of the settlement is 
final, which means the time at which all appeals have been resolved 
or the opportunity to appeal has passed. The logic of quick-pay 
provisions is that class counsel do not incur a cost of delay during the 
pendency of appeal. As a result, the scope of extortion is minimal—
class counsel stand to lose only their direct litigation costs if 
professional objectors appeal. These provisions are reportedly being 
used with increasing frequency, predominantly in securities cases.163
 Quick-pay provisions are only a partial solution to the professional 
objector problem. First, many defendants will likely reject them out 
of hand. To convince corporate executives to pay substantial amounts 
to class counsel, albeit subject to refund, without buying peace 
promises to be a hard sell.   
 Second, the provisions reduce the cost of extortion but do not 
eliminate it. Consider the nature of the bargain between class 
counsel and defendants. A quick-pay provision requires the 
defendant to pay attorneys’ fees, which may represent a significant 
part of the total settlement, earlier than she would have to do under 
conventional settlements. Assume that class counsel are interested 
solely in their attorneys’ fees, and suppose first that the parties use a 
conventional settlement. Imagine that it provides for attorneys’ fees 
of $10,000 and the district court’s judgment is entered at year zero. If 
no appeal is taken, class counsel will earn interest at a rate of 10%, 
or $1000, by year one, for a total payoff of $11,000 at year one. If an 
appeal is taken and ultimately rejected at year one, class counsel will 
receive $10,000 at that time, thus losing the $1000 in interest they 
would have earned absent an appeal. In the simple case, where the 
 161.  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 19, at 1640-41. 
 162.  See id. at 1641. 
 163.  See id. at 1642-46. 
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appeal is certain to lose and appellate litigation costs are assumed to 
be zero, it is this $1000 that creates an opportunity for the 
professional objector to extort by threatening to appeal. The 
bargaining space is $1000. Imagine that the parties split the 
cooperative surplus and class counsel pay the objector $500 at year 
zero not to appeal. The defendant therefore pays attorneys’ fees of 
$10,000 at year zero, and class counsel receive a net of $9500 at that 
time and begin implicitly earning interest on that amount; by year 
one, class counsel would have $10,450—less than $11,000 but more 
than $10,000. If the professional objector appeals, however, the 
defendant would effectively earn the interest of $1,000 on the 
attorneys’ fees between year zero and year one, because the 
defendant would not be obligated to pay $10,000 until year one. From 
the standpoint of the defendant, the appeal is a fortunate 
contingency, and the defendant stands to gain $1000 from it. As the 
probability of that contingency increases, its expected monetary 
value approaches $1000. 
 Under a quick-pay provision, however, the defendant gives up the 
expected gain.164 A rational, risk-neutral defendant would reduce the 
amount she is willing to pay by the expected gain from delay in her 
payment obligation. A quick-pay provision might be thought to create 
competition between the professional objector and the defendant to 
extract the cooperative surplus available when the objector threatens 
to appeal. If class counsel and the defendants use a quick-pay 
provision, the professional objector receives no share of the surplus; if 
class counsel and the professional objector strike a deal under a 
conventional settlement agreement, the defendants receive no share 
of the bargaining surplus. Competition between the professional 
objector and the defendants in theory could drive the amount 
demanded by class counsel’s bargaining partner to zero. 
 Competition, especially between two parties, is often imperfect, 
however, and more important, the sequence of events impedes 
competition. A professional objector is not likely to surface until after 
a settlement is tentatively approved by the district court. That 
settlement agreement will contain the quick-pay provision. When 
class counsel and defendants are negotiating a class settlement, the 
defendants are not competing with professional objectors. Rather, 
class counsel and the defendants at best anticipate the risk of a 
 164.  In the simple case used for illustrative purposes, the expected gain is bounded by 
the date of the appellate court’s decision (or a short time thereafter as stipulated in a 
conventional settlement agreement), because the appeal is assumed to be groundless. If 
there is some probability that the appeal would succeed, however, the delay and hence the 
expected gain from delay may increase as a function of the time required to conduct any 
subsequent proceedings mandated by the appellate court. 
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professional objector filing an objection and taking an appeal. 
Suppose class counsel assess the risk at 50% and expect to strike the 
deal described above under which class counsel pay the objector $500 
not to appeal, receiving a net of $9500. The expected value to class 
counsel of eliminating the possibility of the objection is $250. The 
defendants earn no interest if an objector arises and is paid off, and 
they earn no interest if no objector arises and they are obligated to 
pay attorneys’ fees at year zero. The bargaining space is therefore 
$250, and if class counsel and the defendants split this surplus, the 
defendants would be willing to pay and class counsel would be willing 
to accept $9875 in attorneys’ fees with a quick-pay provision. 
 Moreover, the simple case analyzed above assumes a zero 
probability that the appeal will succeed. But suppose the probability 
is positive, though small. Under a quick-pay provision, the defendant 
incurs a risk that if the judgment is eventually overturned, she will 
not recover the amounts paid in attorneys’ fees despite class counsel’s 
refund obligations, for class counsel may have become insolvent. 
Further, the defendant incurs a risk of litigation to recover the funds 
even when class counsel remain solvent. A rational defendant would 
demand a discount to incur these risks, even if they are small, and 
the discount will exceed the expected monetary value of the loss if 
she is risk averse.  
 The analysis above assumes a simple model. In a more 
complicated model, appellate litigation costs are positive and the 
defendants derive an expected benefit from resolving the class action 
at the time of the final judgment, even though they would gain 
interest on attorneys’ fees during delay incident to appeal. Stated 
otherwise, a more complicated model can demonstrate that 
defendants prefer an immediate settlement to a later one, even 
though they lose the expected benefit of retaining the settlement 
funds for some period of time. 
 A more fundamental objection to quick-pay provisions is that they 
assume wholly self-interested class counsel. Suppose a settlement 
provides for an immediate payment of attorneys’ fees at year zero, 
but a professional objector threatens to delay the class distribution of 
$50,000 until year one by filing a baseless appeal. The logic of quick-
pay provisions is that class counsel are immune to extortion because 
they will suffer no loss from delay, and so extortion will fail. But if 
class counsel take their fiduciary obligations to the class seriously, 
they will identify with the loss the class would suffer and act in the 
best interests of the class. A loss of $5000 in interest imposed on the 
class is a loss imposed on class counsel, and class counsel may feel 
compelled to sacrifice some of their fees to avoid the injury to the 
class. Indeed, quick-pay provisions can be criticized to the extent they 
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exacerbate agency problems by separating the interests of class 
counsel from the interests of the class. Though as a practical matter 
class counsel and the class do have divergent interests and class 
counsel may well be motivated primarily by their narrow self 
interest, class counsel are not likely to be indifferent to the interests 
of the class, and for that reason quick-pay provisions do not eliminate 
the possibility of extortion. 
 Experience teaches that quick-pay provisions are sometimes used, 
indicating that they are valuable to both class counsel and 
defendants in addressing professional objectors. But these provisions 
do not eliminate extortion. Professional objectors continue to impose 
a tax on class action settlements, even if the tax is paid to 
defendants, and even if that tax is lower than it would be if a 
conventional settlement were used and the tax were paid to the 
objectors. In the end, quick-pay provisions do not pose a risk of 
deterring legitimate appeals. But they also do not eliminate 
extortion. They may be simply unacceptable to defendants’ managers, 
and if they are used, they may merely reduce the level of extortionate 
taxation and change the distribution of revenue. 
F.   Adopt Inalienability Rule 
 Professor Fitzpatrick proposes a creative approach to professional 
objectors: adopt an inalienability rule prohibiting objectors from 
settling their appeals.165 He reasons that “[i]f objectors were 
prohibited from selling their right to appeal to class counsel, then 
objectors who wished to appeal solely to extract rents from class 
counsel eager to avoid delay, risk, and litigation costs would not 
bother filing appeals at all.”166 Therefore, he contends, an 
inalienability rule will entirely eliminate extortionate appeals, but it 
will not deter any legitimate appeals, for legitimate objectors intend 
to pursue their appeals to judicial resolution and will not view the 
inability to sell their appeal as a burden.167 The rule “may be the 
optimal solution to the problem of objector blackmail.”168
 The flaw in this approach is that it does not prevent professional 
objectors from extorting payments before the inalienability rule 
attaches. Extortionate behavior in this context involves a sequence of 
two acts: submitting an objection and filing an appeal. The 
inalienability rule cannot sensibly vest until after the settlement is 
 165.  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 19, at 1659-66. 
 166.  Id. at 1662. 
 167.  See id.
 168.  Id. at 1664. 
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approved and notice of appeal is filed.169 But the professional objector 
can offer not to file a notice of appeal in exchange for some payment. 
Extortion is no less effective if perpetrated before an appeal is filed 
than afterward. Indeed, the maximum amount that can be extorted 
declines over time after an appeal is filed. Fitzpatrick apparently is 
aware of the issue, observing in a footnote that “[i]t is important to 
note that an inalienability rule should not simply push back the 
period in which side settlements are negotiated to the thirty days 
during which an objector must file a notice of appeal.”170 Actually, the 
potential period of negotiation is not limited to that thirty-day period, 
for a professional objector could propose a deal under which she 
withholds an appeal even before she files an objection; the parties 
simply anticipate that unless she is paid off the objector will file a 
fruitless objection and appeal the settlement approval, and they 
bargain accordingly. But having recognized the problem that an 
inalienability rule might be circumvented by negotiating a deal 
before the right vests, Fitzpatrick offers no solution. He simply points 
out that an inalienability rule would not prevent legitimate objectors 
from selling their right to appeal before they file a notice of appeal.171
An admission that a rule does not prevent casual extortion is not an 
explanation as to how it prevents professional extortion. 
 An inalienability rule, moreover, could prevent socially valuable 
agreements between class counsel and legitimate objectors settling 
objections after notice of appeal is filed. Fitzpatrick would respond to 
this risk by allowing appeal settlement agreements if they involve a 
modification of the approved class settlement agreement and the 
modified agreement is approved by the district court.172 The district 
court, he argues, “could filter merely cosmetic modifications from 
those in which other class members shared equally in the benefits 
sought by the settling objector.”173 Further, an objector would be free 
to withdraw an appeal and receive nothing in return, subject to some 
verification, such as a sworn certification that the professional 
objector received no consideration.174
 169.  If a firm rule of inalienability vested at the time an objection is filed, every 
unsuccessful objector would be required to appeal. Such a rule would hardly increase social 
welfare. The rule would have to provide for a method by which the obligation to appeal 
could be compromised after it vested, much as Fitzpatrick now proposes for compromise 
during the pendency of appeal, see id. at 1665, but that method involves high judicial 
supervision costs. In any event, even a rule developed along these lines would fail to 
address the fundamental problem, for professional objectors and class counsel could strike 
a bargain before an objection is filed. 
 170.  Id. at 1664 n.155. 
 171.  See id.
 172.  See id. at 1665. 
 173.  Id.
 174.  See id.
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 But this system begs to be circumvented. Given that the district 
judge has already approved the class settlement agreement, she 
would be hard pressed to reject any modification that increased the 
net recovery of the class. Just what justification the court would have 
to reject the modification on the ground that class members did not 
“share equally” with the objector is hard to see. At a minimum, the 
court would have a powerful incentive to approve the modification 
even if the objector received a larger payoff than the marginal benefit 
received by the class. The point of professional objector extortion is to 
hold up class counsel, not the class, and so a deal with class counsel 
would predictably take the form of a payment by class counsel from 
their fees. Absent a modification requirement, an agreement to 
withdraw an appeal might involve class counsel paying the objector 
$1000 from their attorneys’ fees, thus earning $1000 less than 
anticipated under the class settlement; with a modification 
requirement, the agreement might involve changing the class 
settlement agreement in a way that increases its value to the class by 
$100, class counsel paying the objector $1000, and class counsel 
ending up with $1100 less than provided for in the original class 
settlement. Whose interests would the district court be protecting by 
rejecting the modification on the ground that it is “cosmetic”? The 
class is better off, the defendants are not harmed, and the objector 
and class counsel support the change. Moreover, the possibility that 
the professional objector and class counsel will reach a deal under 
which the objector ostensibly receives nothing to give up her appeal, 
which entirely negates the modification requirement, cannot be 
casually dismissed by requiring a verification mechanism. 
Professional objectors as a group are ethically challenged, and to 
assume that they would not skirt or flout a certification requirement 
or other verification device is heroic. Courts have not been aggressive 
in policing the practices of professional objectors, and they are not 
likely to be any more enthusiastic in enforcing ethical requirements 
surrounding a verification device.   
 In the end, an inalienability rule will not prevent professional 
objector extortion, though it will not deter legitimate appeals. It may 
be structured not to discourage legitimate objectors from settling 
their complaints during the pendency of appeal, but if it is, it  
will inevitably create an opening for extortionate conduct by  
professional objectors. 
IV.   APPEAL BONDS AS THE LEAST IMPERFECT APPROACH
 Taking into account the desirable suppression of extortionate 
appeals, the undesirable chilling of legitimate appeals, and the 
administrative costs of any remedy, the approaches to the problem of 
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professional objectors outlined above are all more or less imperfect. 
The approach we favor is also imperfect, but it offers the greatest net 
benefits, and we therefore believe that it is the optimal one. We 
would presumptively require that any objecting nonnamed member 
of a Rule 23(b)(3) class post as a condition of appeal a bond calibrated 
to deter extortion. District courts have occasionally imposed an 
appeal bond requirement on class action objectors.175 But courts have 
disagreed on the legal constraints that affect the availability and 
magnitude of appeal bonds, and most courts have concluded that the 
amount of the bond is seriously constrained, undermining its 
capacity to curb extortionate behavior.176
A.   Existing Practice 
 Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a 
“district court may require an appellant to file a bond or provide 
other security in any form and amount necessary to ensure payment 
of costs on appeal.”177 The rule is permissive, allowing but not 
compelling a district court to require a bond. Accordingly, the court 
must first decide whether to exercise its discretion. If the court 
requires a bond, it then must decide the bond’s amount. Both 
decisions depend on the purpose of a bond, which according to Rule 7 
is “to ensure payment of costs on appeal.”178 A bond set at “costs on 
appeal” would perfectly “ensure payment” of those costs, and a bond 
set at any greater amount would not be “necessary” to the extent of 
the excess, and hence, would be unauthorized.179 Conversely, a bond 
of a lesser amount may be all that is necessary to “ensure payment of 
costs on appeal,” and indeed any security may be unnecessary.180
Consequently, the decision whether to require a bond pursuant to 
Rule 7 and the decision as to the amount of any bond required turn 
on the meaning of “costs on appeal.”   
 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, entitled “Costs,” contains 
five subdivisions.181 Subdivision (a) specifies the parties against 
whom costs should normally be assessed.182 Thus, for example, if an 
appeal is dismissed or a judgment is affirmed, costs are usually taxed 
 175. See cases cited supra note 30. 
 176. See infra notes 195-214 and accompanying text. 




 181. FED. R. APP. P. 39. 
 182.  FED. R. APP. P. 39(a). Another subdivision provides that costs for or against the 
United States may be assessed under Rule 39(a) only if authorized by law. FED. R. APP. P.
39(b). Another requires each court of appeals to fix the maximum rate for taxing the cost of 
producing copies and limits the rate so fixed. FED. R. APP. P. 39(c). Still another specifies a 
process to be used when a party wants costs taxed. FED. R. APP. P. 39(d). 
910 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:865
against the appellant;183 if a judgment is reversed, costs are taxed by 
the court of appeals against the appellee.184 Subdivision (e) provides, 
“The following costs on appeal are taxable in the district court for the 
benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule.”185 The 
subdivision lists the following costs: “(1) the preparation and 
transmission of the record; (2) the reporter’s transcript, if needed to 
determine the appeal; (3) premiums paid for a supersedeas bond or 
other bond to preserve rights pending appeal; and (4) the fee  
for filing the notice of appeal.”186 Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides 
that a “judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as 
costs” certain items: “(1) [f]ees of the clerk and marshal; (2) [f]ees  
for printed or electronically recorded transcripts . . . ; (3) [f]ees  
and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) [f]ees for 
exemplification and the costs of making copies . . . ; (5) [d]ocket fees 
. . . ; [and] (6) [c]ompensation of court appointed experts” and costs 
associated with interpreters.187 Because an appellate court is a “court 
of the United States,” the above items constitute “costs” on appeal. 
One interpretation of Rule 7 is that the “costs on appeal” referenced 
there are the “costs on appeal” identified in Rule 39(e) and § 1920.188
But an interpretation of Rule 39(e) is that the rule merely lists the 
“costs on appeal” that are taxable “under this rule,” meaning Rule 39, 
and so it does not circumscribe the “costs on appeal” that an appeal 
bond may secure under Rule 7.189 Thus all it does is specify, for 
instance, the costs that may be taxed against the appellant under 
Rule 39(a)(2) if a judgment is affirmed. 
 In most cases, plaintiffs and defendants are adversaries in both 
the district and appellate court; either plaintiffs or defendants seek 
in the appellate court to set aside the judgment below, and the other 
side seeks to uphold it. But when an objector appeals the settlement 
of a plaintiff’s class action, she seeks to set aside the judgment, and 
 183.  See FED. R. APP. P. 39(a)(1); FED. R. APP. P. 39(a)(2). 
 184.  FED. R. APP. P. 39(a)(3). 
 185.  FED. R. APP. P. 39(e). 
 186.  FED. R. APP. P. 39(e)(1)–(4). 
 187. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
 188.  See, e.g., In re Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per 
curiam) (“The costs referred to [in Rule 7] . . . are simply those that may be taxed against 
an unsuccessful litigant under Federal Appellate Rule 39 . . . .”). There is no question that 
a court may include both “the costs listed in Appellate Rule 39(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 
when calculating the amount of an appeal bond.” In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., Sec. & 
“ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv. 5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007).  
 189.  See, e.g., Sams v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 
391 F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[Rule 39] merely lists which costs of appeal can be 
‘taxed’ by the district court if it chooses to order one party to pay costs to the other.”). The 
Advisory Committee note does make clear, however, that the costs described in Rule 39(e) 
are at least some of the costs of appeal that can be included in a Rule 7 bond. See FED. R.
APP. P. 39(e) advisory committee’s note (1967 Adoption). 
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both class counsel and the defendants seek to uphold it. Courts have 
had no trouble recognizing that the objector is a plaintiff and, at least 
since Devlin, a party to the lawsuit. But the objector on appeal is in 
an adversarial relationship with both the defendants and the 
majority of plaintiffs. The fact that her interests are antagonistic to 
those of other plaintiffs does not change her status as a plaintiff, and 
courts that have required objectors to file appeal bonds under Rule 7 
calculate the amount of the bond as if the objector is an ordinary 
plaintiff.190 But, as we are about to explain, appellate courts have 
split on whether such a bond may include costs in addition to those 
specified in Rule 39. 
 Although the Supreme Court has not resolved the Rule 7 issue, it 
decided in Marek v. Chesny that “costs” as used in Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 68 means “all costs properly awardable under the 
relevant substantive statute or other authority.”191 Rule 68 provides 
that the offeree must “pay the costs incurred” after rejecting an offer 
essentially if the judgment the offeree finally obtains is less than the 
offer, but it does not define “costs.”192 The Court held that a plaintiff 
in a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not recover 
attorneys’ fees she incurred after rejecting a settlement offer when 
she ultimately recovers a judgment less than the offer.193 Section 
1988 of the statute provides that a prevailing party in a § 1983 action 
may be awarded attorneys’ fees “as part of the costs.”194 Because the 
underlying statute defines attorneys’ fees as costs, the attorneys’ fees 
incurred after an offer is rejected are part of the costs that cannot be 
recovered by the offeree under Rule 68. 
 A majority of circuit courts that have addressed the Rule 7 issue 
have relied on the logic of Marek to hold that the term “costs on 
appeal” includes all expenses defined as costs by an applicable 
substantive statute. For example, in Azizian v. Federated Department 
Stores, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that “the term ‘costs on appeal’ in 
Rule 7 includes all expenses defined as ‘costs’ by an applicable fee-
shifting statute.”195 The court reasoned that Rule 7 does not define 
costs, just as Rule 68 does not define costs, and Marek’s inference 
that the drafters of Rule 68 therefore intended to include all costs 
 190.  However, when a court is permitted to include in an appeal bond costs that can be 
assessed to a party under a substantive statute and the statute permits the court to tax a 
litigant the costs incurred by her opponent in connection with a meritless “suit or . . . 
defense,” the statute may not authorize the court to tax an objector because the objection is 
not a suit or defense. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295-96 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). To this extent, the objector would not be treated as an ordinary plaintiff. 
 191.  Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). 
 192. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 193. Marek, 473 U.S. at 9-12. 
 194.  42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
 195.  499 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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authorized by the underlying statute applies in parallel fashion to 
Rule 7.196 The court also reasoned that, just as Marek relied in part 
on the absence of congressional expressions to the contrary in 
reaching its interpretation of Rule 68, Rule 39 “does not contain any 
‘expression[] to the contrary.’ ”197 Invoking Marek’s admonition “that 
we must take fee-shifting statutes at their word,”198 the court rejected 
the argument that relying on underlying statutes to provide the 
definition of Rule 7 bond costs places too much weight on possibly 
inadvertent differences in wording.199 The Second Circuit in Adsani v. 
Miller similarly held that Rule 7 costs include those defined by the 
underlying statute, “read[ing] Marek to support the view that Rule 
39 does not exhaustively define ‘costs.’ ”200 The Eleventh Circuit201
and the Sixth Circuit202 reached the same conclusion. The implication 
of this position is that if the underlying statute symmetrically 
requires the losing party to pay the attorneys’ fees of the winning 
party, then an appeal bond may include appellate attorneys’ fees of 
class counsel and defense counsel when a class settlement is 
appealed;203 if the statute asymmetrically requires only that a losing 
defendant pay the attorneys’ fees of a winning plaintiff, then an 
appeal bond required of an objector may not include appellate 
attorneys’ fees of the parties seeking to preserve the settlement.204
 By contrast, the Third Circuit in Hirschensohn v. Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corp. held that Rule 7 costs are only those that may be 
 196.  See id. at 958. 
 197.  Id. (quoting Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)). 
 198.  Id. at 959 (citing Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)). The court also observed 
that “allowing district courts to include appellate attorneys’ fees in estimating and ordering 
security for statutorily authorized costs under Rule 7 comports with their role in taxing the 
full range of costs of appeal.” Id.
 199. Id. at 958-59. 
 200.  139 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 201.  See Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[B]oth 
Marek and Adsani’s persuasive application of that decision lead us to conclude that the 
meaning of ‘costs,’ as used in Rule 7, should be derived from the definition of costs 
contained in the statutory fee shifting provision that attends the plaintiff’s underlying 
cause of action.”). 
 202.  See Sams v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 391 
F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We adopt the reasoning of the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
and apply Marek to its interpretation of ‘costs’ under [Rule] 7.”). 
 203.  One court held that if a statute permits a court symmetrically to order a party to 
pay her opponent’s attorneys’ fees if the party’s suit or defense is without merit, it is not a 
fee-shifting statute, but rather a statute that permits sanctions for frivolous filings and as 
such does not authorize the inclusion of attorneys’ fees in the Rule 7 bond. See In re Initial 
Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 204.  See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775 
(JG)(VVP), 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010) (holding that appeal bond 
could not include class counsels’ attorneys’ fees because Clayton Act allows successful 
antitrust plaintiffs to recover fees, not the “prevailing party”). 
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taxed against an unsuccessful litigant under Rule 39.205 Because 
attorneys’ fees are not specified in Rule 39, they cannot be included 
in a Rule 7 bond even though they are authorized by an underlying 
statute. The court distinguished Marek on the ground that “Rule 68 
. . . does not define costs, [but] Rule 39 does so in some detail.”206
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit in In re American 
President Lines, Inc., a case decided only a few months after Marek,
held that the costs referred to in Rule 7 are simply those identified in 
Rule 39.207 The court did not discuss Marek.208 In a later case, 
however, the court did treat attorneys’ fees authorized by an underlying 
statute as costs under Rule 39, and in that case it did cite Marek.209
 Without squarely addressing the issue, the First Circuit in 
Sckolnick v. Harlow affirmed a district court order requiring an 
appeal bond that included attorneys’ fees because “the appeal might 
be frivolous and . . . an award of sanctions against [the] plaintiff on 
appeal was a real possibility.”210 The implication of the decision is 
that costs under Rule 7 are not limited to the costs specified in Rule 
39, but the additional costs need not be authorized by, and are not 
limited to, those identified in an underlying statute. Narrowly read, 
the case stands for the proposition that only attorneys’ fees may be 
added to Rule 39 costs regardless of whether the fees are authorized 
by a substantive statute and then only if the district court concludes 
that the appeal is frivolous,211 though a broader reading would 
expand the permissible costs beyond attorneys’ fees.212 Interestingly, 
though the Ninth Circuit in Azizian held that a Rule 7 bond may 
include attorneys’ fees, it held that a district court may not rely upon 
205. No. 96-7312, 1997 WL 307777, at *1 (3d Cir. June 10, 1997). 
 206.  Hirschensohn, 1997 WL 307777, at *2. 
 207.  779 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
 208.  A district judge in the Seventh Circuit noted that the circuits are split and that 
the Seventh Circuit has not taken a position on the issue, but concluded that he need not 
predict the circuit’s position because attorneys’ fees were not available under the applicable 
statute. Walton v. City of Carmel, No. 1:05-cv-902-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 2397683, at *3-4 
(S.D. Ind. June 10, 2008).  
 209.  See Montgomery & Assocs. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 816 F.2d 783, 
784 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that attorneys’ fees authorized by an underlying statute were 
costs recoverable under Rule 39 and therefore an application for them was subject to the 
time limits specified by Rule 39). 
 210.  820 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 211.  See Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Adams, 656 F. Supp. 2d 240, 241-42 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(noting that the First Circuit has not decided whether attorneys’ fees available under a 
substantive statute may be included in an appeal bond but requiring appellant to post  
a bond that apparently reflects attorneys’ fees because her appeal “bears the indicia  
of frivolousness”).  
 212.  See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 
1361, 2003 WL 22417252, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (holding that Skolnick authorizes the 
inclusion in a Rule 7 bond of attorneys’ fees as well as the costs of delay and disruption of 
settlement administration caused by a frivolous appeal). 
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the court’s assessment that an appeal would be frivolous and 
therefore include those fees in a Rule 7 bond.213 In any event, the 
First Circuit later held that a Rule 7 bond may include attorneys’ 
fees if they are defined as costs by the underlying statute, but it 
found no need to reconsider its position in Sckolnick that frivolity is an 
independent basis for including attorneys’ fees in an appeal bond.214
 Most of the cases addressing the proper scope of a Rule 7 bond do 
so in the context of a request that a bond include appellate attorneys’ 
fees. These fees, as well as the costs identified in Rule 39, are part of 
the costs that an extortionate appeal of a class settlement threaten to 
impose. Another important kind of cost is the cost of delay in 
implementing the settlement, especially the implicit interest lost on 
the settlement funds while the appeal is pending.215 Delay costs 
certainly cannot be included in an appeal bond in circuits that read 
Rule 7 to be limited by Rule 39, for Rule 39 says nothing about these 
costs.216 In circuits that look to the underlying statute, delay costs 
could logically be included in an appeal bond if the underlying 
statute authorizes the relevant party to recover such costs, just as 
the bond may include attorneys’ fees if the statute authorizes their 
recovery.217 In these circuits, some courts have held that if delay costs 
are not authorized by the underlying statute, they cannot be 
included;218 other courts have held that delay costs can be included 
 213.  Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 960 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 214.  See Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 420 F. App’x 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 215.  See, e.g., Cobell v. Salazar, No. CIV.A.96-01285(TFH), 2011 WL 4590776, at *1 
(D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting plaintiffs’ request that an appeal bond include over $3.1 
million “for post-judgment interest”). Though delay costs usually relate to the time-use 
value of the settlement fund, they can include marginal costs incurred in the 
administration of the fund as a result of delay. See, e.g., id. (noting plaintiffs’ request that 
an appeal bond include nearly $2.6 million “for the ‘increased cost of settlement 
administration’ ”); In re Compact Disc, 2003 WL 22417252, at *1 (noting plaintiffs’ 
allegations of the settlement disruption costs that appeal would cause); In re NASDAQ 
Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (reciting plaintiffs’ 
description of the administrative costs incurred when the processing of claims is 
interrupted and restarted). 
 216.  See, e.g., Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), 
No. Civ.A. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2000) (concluding that delay 
damages in the Third Circuit could be included only in a supersedeas bond and finding that 
class counsel could request only a cost bond under Rule 7). 
 217.  See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (implying that appeal bond could include delay costs if authorized by underlying 
statute but finding that relevant statute did not authorize them); In re AOL Time Warner, 
Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv. 5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
20, 2007) (same). 
 218.  See, e.g., Cobell, 2011 WL 4590776, at *4 (rejecting request that delay costs be 
included in appeal bond where underlying statute did not treat delay costs or attorneys’ 
fees as recoverable costs); In re Initial Pub. Offering, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97; Fleury v. 
Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 
2008); In re AOL Time Warner, 2007 WL 2741033, at *4. 
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anyway.219 Of course in the First Circuit, where a Rule 7 bond may 
include costs incurred because of a frivolous appeal, the costs of delay  
might qualify.220
 Courts that have resisted the inclusion of delay costs in Rule 7 
bonds emphasize the difference between Rule 7 bonds and 
supersedeas bonds.221 A supersedeas bond is filed by the losing party 
usually in the trial court and stays the execution of a judgment 
pending appeal. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d), the 
stay automatically takes effect when the district court approves the 
bond.222 A motion for a stay and approval of a supersedeas bond may 
also be made in the appellate court pursuant to Appellate Rule 8 if 
moving first in the district court is impractical or the district court 
denied the relief.223 A supersedeas bond ordinarily must be in the full 
amount of the judgment and may include “ ‘damages for delay’ 
and . . . interest on the appeal.”224 Some courts apparently reason 
that if delay damages are an element of supersedeas bonds, they 
cannot be included in Rule 7 bonds, sometimes called “cost bonds,”225
which serve a different purpose; professional objectors do not seek to 
post supersedeas bonds.226
 219.  See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 1.09-MD-02036-JLK, 2012 
WL 456691, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012) (including in a bond interest to account for 
“delay of distribution of funds to the class”); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 91-
0986-CIV, 2006 WL 1132371, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2006) (including in a bond “interest 
that the entire class will lose as a result of the appeal” apparently without explicit 
statutory authority); In re NASDAQ, 187 F.R.D. at 128-29. 
 220.  See Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. C.A. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 71072, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (noting that “First Circuit case law indicates 
that ‘costs,’ as contemplated in Rule 7, include the costs attendant to the delay associated 
with an appeal” and including interest on a settlement for the expected duration of an 
appeal where appeal was taken by professional objectors); In re Compact Disc, 2003 WL 
22417252, at *1 (holding that Skolnick authorizes the inclusion in a Rule 7 bond of 
“damages resulting from delay or disruption of settlement administration caused by a 
frivolous appeal”). 
 221.  There is no question that a Rule 7 bond differs from a supersedeas bond. See, e.g.,
Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 70 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that a supersedeas bond 
and a Rule 7 bond “should not be confused”); In re Compact Disc, 2003 WL 22417252, at *1 
(“[A Rule 7] bond is to be distinguished from a supersedeas bond. . . .”); 16A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3953, at 573 (4th ed. 2008) (“Rule 7 
concerns giving a bond or other security for costs on appeal in a civil case. It should not be 
confused with a supersedeas bond, which sometimes must be filed to obtain a stay of 
execution of a judgment pending the appeal.”). 
 222. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d). 
 223.  FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(2). 
 224.  Omaha Hotel Co. v. Kountze, 107 U.S. 378, 388 (1883). See also In re NASDAQ,
187 F.R.D. at 128 (relying on Omaha Hotel for the proposition that damages for delay may 
be included in a Rule 7 bond). 
 225.  See Adsani, 139 F.3d at 70 n.2 (noting confusion in terminology and suggesting 
that Rule 7 bond, “cost bond,” and “appeal bond” are synonyms and distinguishable from 
“supersedeas bond”). 
 226.  See, e.g., In re Enfamil Lipil Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 11-MD-02222, 
2012 WL 1189763, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2012) (holding that delay costs could not be 
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 Of course, an appeal by a class settlement objector does not fit the 
mold for which appellate supersedeas bonds were designed. The 
objector is not liable under the district court’s judgment, and she is 
not attempting to overturn a judgment against her in the appellate 
court. In the usual situation, a defendant found liable below is 
attempting to delay the execution of the judgment, and a supersedeas 
bond is useful primarily to secure the judgment, lest circumstances 
change during the pendency of the appeal that prevent the plaintiff 
from collecting. Absent a stay of execution, the plaintiff could 
immediately collect on the judgment, and the supersedeas bond is 
required as a kind of quid pro quo for the stay.227 By contrast, the 
delay in execution of a judgment approving a class settlement does 
not arise because of entry of a judicial stay. After all, the defendants 
have agreed to their liability under the settlement. Rather, the delay 
during the pendency of the appeal arises because of the terms of the 
settlement. The costs of delay during the pendency of appeal arise for 
very different reasons in the supersedeas bond case and the class 
settlement objection case, but the costs themselves are comparable.228
The idea that delay costs should be taken into account somehow in 
cases where supersedeas bonds are irrelevant is easy to understand, 
and the ready mechanism is the Rule 7 bond, even if that bond was 
not intended to be used for that purpose.  
 Whatever elements may be included in a Rule 7 bond, courts have 
considered the question of whether to require a bond to be separate 
included in a bond sought only under Rule 7 where the settlement imposed delay costs on 
the defendant); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv. 
5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007); Brown v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CIV.A. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134, 
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2000). Not relying on the relationship to supersedeas bonds, one 
district court reasoned that delay damages fall within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1912, 
which allows an appellate court to award “the prevailing party just damages for his delay, 
and single or double costs.” The statute thus distinguishes between “damages” and “costs,” 
and Rule 7 contemplates only cost bonds. Section 1912 is often cited in tandem with 
Federal Appellate Rule 38, and a Rule 7 bond does not encompass damages and penalties 
awardable under Rule 38. See Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 
WL 4680033, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008). 
 227.  One court explained, “It appears that a ‘supersedeas bond’ is retrospective 
covering sums related to the merits of the underlying judgment (and stay of its execution), 
whereas a ‘cost bond’ is prospective relating to the potential expenses of litigating an 
appeal.” Adsani, 139 F.3d at 70 n.2. To the extent that a supersedeas bond can include the 
costs of delay during the pendency of the appeal, however, it has a prospective component. 
 228.  As one court aptly observed, frivolous appeals of a judgment approving a class 
settlement are “tantamount to a stay” of the judgment. In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t 
Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 
2010). See also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 1.09-MD-02036-JLK, 2012 WL 
456691, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012) (noting that the filing of an appeal by professional 
objectors “prevents distribution of the Settlement proceeds [and] is an actual stay of 
Judgment,” making a Rule 8 bond appropriate). 
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from the question of the amount of the bond,229 though the need for a 
bond is surely a function of the maximum amount of a bond. A 
standard formulation is that in deciding whether to impose a Rule 7 
bond, “courts typically consider[:] (1) the appellant’s financial ability 
to post a bond; (2) the risk that the appellant would not pay 
appellee’s costs if the appeal is unsuccessful[;] (3) the merits of the 
appeal[;] and (4) whether the appellant has shown any bad faith or 
vexatious conduct.”230 The first two considerations are related, for the 
risk of nonpayment is a function of the individual’s wealth, and 
wealth determines the person’s ability to post a bond. An inquiry into 
the merits of the appeal is an inquiry into the probability that the 
appeal will fail, which when multiplied by the costs that can be 
assessed to a losing appellant equals the expected assessed costs of 
the appeal. The probability of failure must be greater than fifty 
percent, otherwise the district court would have reached the opposite 
result.231 As the probability of failure increases, the expected costs 
increase, and an extortionate appeal is assumed to be one with a high 
probability of failure. If an inquiry into bad faith or vexatious conduct 
has independent significance, it cannot mean merely that an appeal 
has a low probability of success. In addition, in a circuit that 
prohibits a district court from setting a Rule 7 bond to take into 
account its judgment that an appeal is frivolous within the meaning 
of Appellate Rule 38, the fourth consideration must relate to conduct 
elsewhere in the litigation. 
 Courts have held that failure to post an appeal bond that a district 
court orders is not a jurisdictional defect; rather, an appellate court 
has discretion to dismiss an appeal when a bond is not posted or to 
consider the merits of the appeal.232 Federal Rule of Appellate 
 229.  See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, 2007 WL 2741033, at *3 (“The question of 
whether to impose an appeal bond is distinct from the issue of what costs the bond can and 
should cover.”). 
 230.  Gemelas v. Dannon Co., No. 1:08 CV 236, 2010 WL 3703811, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 
31, 2010). See also Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035(HB), 2011 WL 
5873383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (identifying same considerations); In re 
Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL 
5147222, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2010) (identifying same considerations); Fleury v. 
Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 
2008) (identifying same considerations); Chiaverini, Inc. v. Frenchie’s Fine Jewelry, Coins 
& Stamps, Inc., No. 04-CV-74891-DT, 2008 WL 2415340, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2008) 
(identifying same considerations); Baker v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., No. 01 CV. 5440 LAP, 
2006 WL 3635392, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006) (identifying same considerations). 
 231.  Cf. Blessing, 2011 WL 5873383, at *3 (“Naturally, this appeal in my view lacks 
merit, a factor weighing in favor of requiring a bond.”). 
 232.  See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 961-62 (9th Cir. 
2007) (noting that “it is within [the appellate court’s] sound discretion to dismiss the 
appeal” when an appellant has failed to pay an appeal bond and finding dismissal 
inappropriate); Sams v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 
391 F.3d 812, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2004) (observing that “[a]lthough failure to execute a bond 
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Procedure 3(a)(2) supports this view, stating that “[a]n appellant’s 
failure to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only 
for the court of appeals to act as it considers appropriate, including 
the dismissal of the appeal.”233
B.   Proposed Approach 
 The above survey of existing law discloses three basic approaches 
to appeal bonds: (1) a bond may include only costs identified in Rule 
39 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920; (2) a bond may include these costs and any 
costs to which the appellee would be entitled under an applicable 
substantive statute; and (3) a bond may include all costs imposed by 
a frivolous appeal. The first approach has the strongest legal 
foundation. The most natural reading of the rules of appellate 
procedure tie the costs that can be included in an appeal bond 
required under Rule 7 to the costs that can be taxed under Rule 39, 
and § 1920 costs can be included by authority of that statute. But 
appeal bonds are most tightly constrained under this approach, and 
as we explain below, the best method of addressing professional 
objector extortion is through appeal bonds that include the full costs 
of the appeal imposed on others, including appellate attorneys’ fees 
and delay damages. The second approach offers greater promise, but 
bonds of the necessary magnitude are not consistently available 
under even this approach, for it is dependent on a wide array of 
substantive statutes with different cost-shifting provisions, many of 
which do not contemplate the imposition of full costs on a class 
settlement objector.234 The third approach might permit the 
systematic requirement of adequate bonds, but it has been adopted 
by only one circuit, its contours are hazy, and it has the least 
satisfying basis in existing law. We therefore propose a change in the 
law as outlined below. We begin by laying out the elements of an 
effective method of using appeal bonds to suppress professional 
objectors, then provide refinements designed to avoid deterring 
legitimate appeals. Finally, we offer specific proposed rule 
amendments to implement our approach. 
 An appeal bond mechanism that effectively deters extortion will 
have three components: (1) a nonnamed class settlement objector is 
for costs on appeal has been generally considered as not being jurisdictional . . . failure to 
execute such a bond unless exempted by law, is grounds for dismissal of the appeal” and 
finding dismissal appropriate (quoting Powers v. Citizens Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 
329 F.2d 507, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1964))). 
 233. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(2). 
 234.  Cf. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing 
variations in more than 100 fee-shifting statutes).  
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liable for the full costs of an appeal imposed on others, including all 
delay costs incurred by the class and class counsel and appellate 
attorneys’ fees; (2) the objector must post a bond for the full costs of 
appeal; and (3) the appellate court cannot hear an appeal on the 
merits of the settlement or the bond requirement unless the bond is 
posted. The first two components are complements. A bond secures 
the amount for which the individual posting the bond will be liable in 
the event liability attaches. A bond is needed in the case of a class 
settlement objector regardless of the individual’s perceived ability to 
pay the liability in part to avoid the cost of mistaken ability to pay 
and in part to avoid the cost of collection. That collection cost would 
itself be a source of potential extortion, albeit a limited one. The costs 
of appeal accumulate during the pendency of appeal. If the objector 
withdraws the appeal at some time after she files it, she would be 
liable for all costs incurred by others up to that time. This amount 
would be paid to the class and class counsel from the appeal bond. 
 The magnitude of the proposed liability and bond requires some 
elaboration. The object of an appeal bond is to make class counsel 
indifferent between defending an appeal and facing no appeal. Stated 
otherwise, if an appeal will impose no cost on class counsel, the 
payoff to class counsel in the noncooperative solution is zero. There is 
no cooperative surplus in a single-period game, and class counsel will 
not be willing to pay anything to rid themselves of an appeal that will 
cost them nothing. Assume for now that an appeal has no chance of 
success. If class counsel define their interests narrowly, without 
regard to the welfare of the class, liability and a bond set at appellate 
attorneys’ fees plus interest on the attorneys’ fees specified in the 
settlement render class counsel impervious to extortion. A bond 
routinely set in this amount would probably be sufficient to eliminate 
most professional objector extortion. But delay will impose costs on 
the class, certainly in the form of lost interest and perhaps in the 
form of higher settlement administration costs.235 Class counsel who 
 235.  If a settlement does not become effective until any appeals are concluded, an 
appeal imposes a delay cost on the class and class counsel in the form of lost interest, and 
it presumably imposes some lesser cost on the defendants, because the defendants do not 
buy peace as quickly as they otherwise would but do obtain interest on the settlement 
during the pendency of the appeal. If the parties anticipate the possibility of an appeal, 
they may take account of the expected cost of the delay in the settlement amount. The 
settlement amount would then represent a sharing of the loss caused by the appeal that 
reflects the disparate impact of delay. Class counsel and the defendants cannot eliminate 
the cost of an extortionate appeal by private agreement; they can merely allocate the loss 
between them. If the class is then compensated by the appellant for the full cost of delay, 
the class will be overcompensated. But the cost imposed on the appellant does not over-
deter, because the excess compensation corresponds to the uncompensated loss incurred by 
the defendants. If class counsel and the defendants anticipate that the class will be fully 
compensated for any delay by the appellant, then the settlement amount would not reflect 
any sharing of the loss from delay by the defendants. The Fifth Circuit’s assertion in this 
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perceive their interests to be coincident with those of the class they 
represent will incur the cost imposed on the class and to that extent a 
bond based solely on attorneys’ fees will not adequately deter 
extortion, even when an appeal has no chance of success. Moreover, 
basing a bond on attorneys’ fees alone might suggest that the law 
condones lawyers disregarding the interests of their clients in class 
litigation, a suggestion that might exacerbate agency problems in 
this context. To thwart extortion, therefore, the liability and bond 
should be set at the full cost of appeals imposed on others. This 
amount will include any appellate attorneys’ fees incurred by defense 
counsel, for as long as an appeal would impose any costs on others, 
there is room for extortion. 
 An extortionate appeal, however, is likely to have some probability 
of success. For this reason, even if the full direct costs of appeal are 
shifted ex ante to the professional objector through an appeal bond, 
an appeal will probably impose some expected cost on class counsel; 
and in a repeated-game setting, professional objectors may be able to 
extort a settlement even if the expected monetary value of the appeal 
to the objector is more than the expected monetary value to class 
counsel. But the expected cost of a successful appeal is difficult to 
estimate. If the appeal succeeds, at a minimum, the direct costs of 
appeal will not be shifted to the objector. The appeal might result in 
a mere redistribution of the settlement fund among class members. It 
might result in an increase in the settlement fund. Attorneys’ fees for 
past work might be unaffected, and class counsel might be 
compensated for additional work necessary to revise the settlement. 
But the appeal might instead result in a reduction in class counsel 
compensation, either by reducing attorneys’ fees for completed work 
or by requiring class counsel to perform unpaid work, and class 
counsel will perceive their own reduced compensation as a cost of the 
appeal even if it is offset exactly by an increase in class compensation. 
 The implication of an appeal having some probability of success is 
that the imposition of the full direct costs of appeal on a losing 
regard in Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 507 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), 
is perplexing. The court concluded that because the “settlement agreement makes no 
provision for the payment of pre-judgment interest,” the parties “agreed that the financial 
time-value of the benefits to be paid under the settlement is not to be awarded to the 
plaintiffs,” and the interest on the settlement during the pendency of the appeal was not a 
“cost” incurred by the class. The fact that a settlement agreement does not provide that the 
class will be paid interest during the pendency of an appeal on its face suggests that an 
appeal does injure the class, rather than that it does not. Perhaps the court means that the 
parties contemplated appellate delay in setting the settlement amount, so that the class 
was compensated ex ante. But contemplation of appellate delay means only that the cost of 
delay was allocated between the parties, and the defendants may have agreed to shoulder 
some of it. To refuse to impose the cost of delay on the appellant in such circumstances 
externalizes the cost to the class and the defendants in some proportions. 
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objector coupled with an appeal bond will not entirely eliminate the 
possibility of extortion. It will, however, substantially reduce its 
scope and probability. The expected cost of the appeal to class counsel 
will be a fraction of what it would otherwise be, and the expected cost 
of appeal is the upper bound on what class counsel would be willing 
to pay to avoid an appeal. It establishes the limit on what the 
objector can gain from extortion. Further, as the expected cost of the 
appeal to the objector increases, the threat that the objector would 
incur the cost as an investment in reputation becomes less credible. 
 The third component of an effective bond mechanism is that 
unless the objector posts the bond required by the district court, the 
appellate court cannot hear an appeal from a nonnamed class 
member objector on the merits of the settlement or on any aspect of 
the bond itself. If a professional objector can have any appeal relating 
to the class settlement considered by the appellate court without 
posting a bond, the bond requirement is toothless. The strategic 
importance of an appeal to the objector is that it postpones the date 
on which all litigation relating to the settlement is concluded, for the 
conventional settlement does not permit implementation until that 
date. If the appellate court hears an appeal challenging the 
imposition of a bond requirement or the amount of the bond set when 
the bond has not been filed, the objector has accomplished her 
strategic objective just as surely as if the court considers the merits 
of the settlement challenge without the posting of a bond. Anything 
other than the appellate court’s summary dismissal of an appeal for 
failure to post a bond opens the way for extortion, because otherwise 
the objector could threaten to prolong the litigation by filing an 
appeal, whether she is willing to wait for a resolution or plans to 
withdraw the appeal prior to resolution. 
 Although implementing a restriction on hearing appeals absent 
the posting of a bond would require a change in federal practice, the 
change is not as radical as it might first appear. A major justification 
for hearing appeals now absent the filing of a required bond is the 
uncertainty in the law regarding the costs that may be included in a 
Rule 7 bond.236 The first two components of a bond mechanism 
sketched above would eliminate most of that uncertainty. What 
would remain is uncertainty about the measurement of the full costs 
of appeal imposed on others. An objector would generally not be able 
to have an appellate court review the amount of the bond without 
posting the bond. This is not a trivial constraint, but it serves a vital 
purpose, and for reasons explored below the error costs should not be 
 236.  For example, in one case the court considered an appeal even though the objector 
had not posted a required bond in part because the objector argued, correctly in the court’s 
view, that the amount of the bond was legally erroneous. Azizian, 499 F.3d at 962. 
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high. An alternative would be to allow the appellate court routinely 
to consider on an expedited basis an appeal limited to the bond 
requirement or its amount. But the opportunity cost of considering 
bond appeals out of turn is unacceptably high, just as is the 
opportunity cost of considering the merits of the settlement challenge 
out of turn. 
 A bond mechanism containing the components described above 
would, therefore, greatly reduce though not eliminate the prospect of 
extortionate appeals, and it would do so at low administrative costs. 
A district court would have to determine the full costs of appeal, but 
in most cases the calculation could be made based on the terms of the 
settlement, readily available data on prevailing interest rates and 
average duration of appeals in the relevant circuit, estimates of 
appellate attorneys’ fees, and evidence of marginal settlement 
administration costs. But requiring objectors to post properly 
calculated appeal bonds has the potential to deter legitimate appeals. 
To minimize this cost, we would permit the district court to reduce 
the amount of the bond to as low as the costs now set out in Federal 
Appellate Rule 39 and § 1920 when the judge determines that (1) the 
appeal is legitimate and (2) a bond for the full amount would 
effectively block the appeal. Correspondingly, if the appeal fails, the 
objector would be liable only to the extent of the bond required. We 
would implement this approach by establishing a presumption that a 
full appeal bond with an associated liability will be imposed in every 
case, allowing evidence of the appeal’s legitimacy and the objector’s 
limited financial wherewithal to rebut the presumption. 
 A reduction in the presumptive bond amount would require the 
necessary finding on both legitimacy and financial resources. 
Allowing a reduction merely because of the appellant’s inability to 
pay would have the effect of facilitating extortion by poor professional 
objectors, or at least encouraging prosperous objectors to hide their 
wealth. The legitimacy requirement is designed to screen out 
extortionate appeals, and the limited financial capacity requirement 
is designed to reduce the cost of errors in finding legitimacy by 
imposing the full bond requirement on all appellants able to satisfy 
it. The principal evidence on the legitimacy of the appeal would be 
the district court’s assessment of the probability of success. A 
legitimate appeal could certainly have a probability of success less 
than fifty percent—if the judge estimated the probability at above 
fifty percent, the judge would have erred in approving the settlement 
by her own assessment. As the court’s estimate of the appeal’s 
probability drops toward zero, the conclusion that the appeal is 
illegitimate becomes more likely. In determining legitimacy, the 
court would also be allowed to consider the quality of the briefs filed 
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and argument made by the objector in the district court, the behavior 
of the objector in the litigation, and the conduct of the objector in 
other cases. All of this bears upon the legitimacy of the appeal, an 
inquiry intended to identify appeals filed for the purpose of extortion. 
 Allowing an objector to avoid the normal bond requirement 
creates a risk that the district court will mistakenly allow 
professional objectors to appeal without posting the bond that is set 
to quash extortion. This is an error of underinclusion, but it is a 
manageable risk. The greater concern is that district courts will 
impose prohibitive appeal bonds on legitimate objectors, an error of 
overinclusion. Some argue that a large appeal bond required of any 
objector will deter the appeal, thus insulating the district court’s 
decision from review,237 and courts will have a tendency to impose the 
bond requirement even on legitimate objectors to avoid appellate 
scrutiny of their decisions. 238
 Recognize first that a large appeal bond will not always deter an 
appeal. The objector may post the bond. The expected liability 
embodied in a bond is a function of the probability of the appeal’s 
success. The more likely the appeal is to succeed, the less likely the 
appellant will be held liable for appellate costs, and the more likely 
the party will post the bond and appeal. Professional objectors are 
likely to be deterred by the bond requirement, because they realize 
that they have little chance of success on appeal. But if a district 
court mistakenly believes that an appeal is illegitimate because  
it has a low chance of success, the objector may post the bond  
because of her assessment that the appeal has a much greater 
probability of success. 
 A district court might want to suppress appeals of class settlement 
approvals for two reasons. First, no judge wants to be reversed—
reversal typically represents a criticism of the judge’s work, and even 
constructive criticism may be unwelcome. Second, the reversal of a 
settlement approval will usually mean more work for the court, work 
that may be particularly onerous. District courts are busy, and class 
action litigation is often especially time consuming. If approval of a 
class settlement ends the litigation, the court can go on to other 
cases, but if the judgment is reversed, the court will be thrown back 
into the case. A judge need not consciously decide to impose a bond 
on a legitimate objector to thwart an appeal and thereby reduce the 
 237.  See, e.g., Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 507 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam) (noting that the imposition of a large appeal bond may “insulate a district court’s 
judgment in approving a class settlement from appellate review”). 
 238.  See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 19, at 1656 (“[P]ermitting district courts to order 
large Rule 7 bonds effectively allows them to decide whether their own rulings can be 
challenged on appeal, and it is easy to [see] why they might over use this authority.”). 
924 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:865
chance of reversal. The judge may simply have a tendency to 
construe ambiguous evidence in a way that justifies the imposition of  
a bond. 
 A judge’s interest in suppressing class settlement appeals is clear, 
but the strength of the tendency to pursue that interest by unduly 
burdening legitimate objectors with large bond obligations is not. We 
have no empirical proof that judges would be unbiased in appeal 
bond determinations, but there is some reason for optimism. The 
personal observations of one of the authors (Smith), who has spent 
nearly twenty-five years in the federal judiciary on both the district 
and circuit court levels, suggest that judges routinely try to do the 
right thing. This is no more than anecdotal evidence, and it goes 
more to negating the possibility that judges would deliberately 
impose appeal bond requirements on legitimate objectors to impede 
appeals than to negating the possibility that self-interest would 
infect the judges’ analysis. But judges are not oblivious to the 
benefits they might derive from an appeal bond that quashes an 
appeal, and that recognition may induce judges committed to 
reaching the correct result to examine their bond decisions carefully, 
question their motivation, and err on the side of the objector. Indeed, 
the tendency to give the objector the benefit of the doubt and thereby 
facilitate extortionate appeals is one reason we propose establishing 
a presumption that a bond for the full costs of appeal will be imposed 
on all nonnamed class member objectors. 
 Further, district courts have resisted requests by class counsel to 
impose appeal bond requirements on settlement objectors within the 
limits recognized by circuit law in circumstances that easily could 
have justified their imposition.239 In one case in the First Circuit, for 
example, class counsel requested an appeal bond of $350,300, and the 
court recognized that the attorney for the appellant had filed a 
“groundless objection,” appeared to be “a repeat objector in class 
action cases,” was proposing to file an appeal that “ ‘might be 
frivolous,’ ” and faced “a real possibility” of sanctions on appeal.240
Circuit law permitted appeal bonds in an unlimited amount for 
 239.  Of course the refusal to order a bond in the amount requested by class counsel 
when the court believes that the amount requested includes legally impermissible costs 
does not indicate that courts exercise discretion to maximize their own utility; they do not 
perceive that they have discretion. See, e.g., Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-
4525 EMC, 2008 WL 4680033, at *5, *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (refusing a request to 
order a bond of more than $380,000 that included delay costs and setting the bond instead 
at $5,000 where the court concluded that delay costs may not be included in a bond); In re 
AOL Time Warner, Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Cv. 5575(SWK), 2007 WL 2741033, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007) (refusing a request to include in a bond the costs of delay in 
administering a settlement where such costs were not authorized by law). 
 240.  In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1361, 
2003 WL 22417252, at *1, *2 & n.3 (D. Maine Oct. 7, 2003). 
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frivolous appeals.241 But the court ordered a bond of $35,000, 
explaining, “I am . . . mindful of the fact that objectors sometimes 
serve a useful role in helping police class action settlements . . . . To 
pose too high a hurdle for objectors, therefore, could create a general 
deterrent that might well not comport with public policy.”242 In 
another case, the court refused to require objectors to file any appeal 
bond, despite evidence that “the objectors are represented by counsel 
who specialize in objecting to class-action settlements” and had been 
found to have “objected in bad faith” in other cases.243 The court 
observed that “there are legitimate issues to pursue on appeal, and 
for that reason I cannot say that the appeals are meritless.”244 The 
court concluded, “[A]lthough it is possible that the objectors’ true 
motives are to obstruct the settlement in the hopes of ‘getting paid to 
go away,’ the evidence in the record does not enable me to find that any 
objector is pursuing his or her appeal for an improper purpose.”245
 Again, this evidence is no more than suggestive. An empirical 
study we leave for another day would begin by comparing the 
number of cases in which an appeal bond request was denied with 
the number in which it was granted. But the evidence at least 
demonstrates that judges sometimes refuse to exercise their 
discretion to erect a bond barrier to appeal despite their knowledge 
that an appeal carries a risk of reversal with its attendant costs for  
the court. 
 Finally, district courts now are called upon to certify cases for 
appellate review, and they do so despite recognizing that they could 
reduce the probability of reversal and reduce the chances of adding to 
their workload by denying certification. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a 
district court may certify for interlocutory appeal an order that 
involves “a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion.”246 The court must also 
believe that an immediate appeal “may materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation,”247 and so certification 
ostensibly represents an act that would at worst leave the court’s 
workload unaffected and at best reduce it. But certification 
 241.  See Sckolnick v. Harlow, 820 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
 242.  See In re Compact Disc, 2003 WL 22417252, at *2. 
 243.  In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 08-
1999, 2010 WL 4630846, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2010). 
 244.  Id.
 245.  Id. (citation omitted). See also In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices 
Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at *1, *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010) 
(rejecting request to order multiple objectors to post appeal bonds ranging from $608,000 to 
$2,286,000 where the appeals “are frivolous and are tantamount to a stay” of the judgment 
approving the settlement and instead setting the bond for each at $500,000). 
 246.  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
 247.  Id.
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nevertheless is an invitation by the district court for the appellate 
court to reverse its decision, and in some circumstances reversal will 
predictably prolong the litigation. For example, the court may 
recognize that absent interlocutory appeal its order permitting the 
litigation to continue will induce the parties to settle quickly, 
whereas interlocutory appeal will prolong the litigation for at least 
the duration of the appeal. Despite the potential adverse 
consequences for the district court, courts do certify cases for 
interlocutory review.248 Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), an 
appeal may not be taken from the final order in habeas corpus 
proceedings unless a circuit or district court judge issues a 
“certificate of appealability”; the judge may not issue the certificate 
unless the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of 
a constitutional right. The mechanism is designed to screen out 
frivolous appeals.249 An appeal creates an opportunity for the 
reviewing court to reverse the district court, and reversal has the 
potential to increase the district court’s workload. Yet district courts 
grant these certificates.250
 One can think about an appeal bond mechanism as tantamount to 
a relaxed certification procedure. If an appeal bond precludes appeal, 
imposing it would have the same effect as would refusal to grant an 
appeal certification necessary for appellate review. And one 
alternative to a bond mechanism would be a requirement that 
nonnamed class member objectors obtain from the district court a 
certificate allowing appeal as a condition of appealing. Both a bond 
mechanism and a certification procedure would vest primary 
authority in the district court to police appeals. That is where the 
authority must be vested if extortionate appeals are to be effectively 
suppressed. Though that authority can be misused, the risk that 
district judges will misuse that power is less serious than the risk 
that professional objectors will continue to exploit their ability to 
hijack class actions. But a bond mechanism is not in fact binary, and 
a certification procedure is. A bond can be paid, and a court can 
 248.  See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3929, 
at 363 (2d ed. 1996) (reporting that in the early years of the statute appellate courts 
received applications in about 100 cases per year); Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing 
Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1174-76 (1990) 
(reporting numbers of cases certified for interlocutory appeal by district courts). 
 249.  See, e.g., Sengenberger v. Townsend, 473 F.3d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing 
the certificate of appealability requirement as “a mechanism . . . to monitor and  
preclude the taking of frivolous appeals”); 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3968.1, at 76-77 (4th ed. 2008) (“Courts have noted that  
the COA requirement serves to protect the government from having to defend against  
frivolous appeals.”). 
 250.  See Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District 
Courts 53 (2007) (reporting data on certificates of appealability in habeas cases granted by 
federal district courts), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf.  
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calibrate the amount of the bond to the harm that an appeal will do. 
Also, the proposed bond mechanism is only an extension of time 
honored appeal bond requirements. A certification procedure that by 
its terms permits a district court to insulate its decision from 
appellate review is not a mere extension of existing certification 
procedures, but a fundamentally different procedural device. The 
bond mechanism is preferable to a certification procedure even if the 
two devices would usually achieve the same ends because it is more 
supple and less radical. 
 Although district courts can generally be trusted to implement 
appropriately the appeal bond mechanism described above, courts 
undeniably would have substantial power. To prevent instances of 
serious abuse, appellate courts could exercise their mandamus power 
under the All Writs Act251 to override the district court’s decision by 
ordering the court to rescind or lower a bond. Such an order, where 
the bond is prohibitive and unjustified by the circumstances, would 
surely be in aid of the appellate court’s jurisdiction.252 This is no more 
than a last resort, for the appellate court can exercise its authority 
only to remedy clear abuses of discretion by a lower court.253 But it 
should be no more than that, because if a writ of mandamus were a 
commonplace remedy, professional objectors could routinely seek it in 
the appellate court thereby bypassing the bond device, which would 
then fail to suppress extortion.254 A mandamus proceeding “must be 
given preference over ordinary civil cases,”255 and the extraordinary 
showing necessary for a writ of mandamus would allow the appellate 
court to dismiss on motion unexceptional petitions by professional 
objectors, blunting any value the petition would have as a basis  
of extortion. 
C.   Rule Revisions 
 Implementing the appeal bond approach described above would 
require changes in the law, but they would not be difficult to make. 
 251.  28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). 
 252.  See WRIGHT, supra note 248, § 3932, at 473 (“The most fundamental condition 
imposed on issuance of the extraordinary writs by the courts of appeals is that they be in 
aid of jurisdiction.”). 
 253.  See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1989) (recognizing that 
extraordinary remedy of mandamus may be used by appellate court to address clear abuse 
of discretion by district court); see also MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL
APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 3.02, at 188 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has often stated that mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy”). 
 254.  Cf. In re Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C., 973 F.2d 1133, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992) (“The 
very power of the writ of mandamus demands that its availability be limited to narrow 
circumstances lest it quickly become a shortcut by which disappointed litigants might 
circumvent the requirements of appellate procedure mandated by Congress.”). 
 255.  FED. R. APP. P. 21(b)(6). 
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The necessary revisions could be accomplished in a number of ways, 
but the simplest approach would be to amend the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Here, we set out three changes that would 
establish an effective bond mechanism. Our interest is in the 
substance of the proposed provisions, not the precise language; more 
elegant and technically precise amendments are no doubt possible. 
?Amend Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 to add the 
following subdivision (f): “Notwithstanding other subdivisions 
of this rule, whenever a nonnamed member of a class certified 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 appeals a judgment 
approving a settlement of the class action and the judgment is 
affirmed, the appellate court will tax the appellant the full costs 
of appeal imposed on others, including all costs of delay, 
attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the appeal, and costs 
described in subdivision (e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, unless the 
court finds that appellant raised substantial issues of law and 
did not appeal primarily to obtain a payment for withdrawing 
the appeal.  If the court so finds, it will tax appellant the costs 
specified in subdivision (e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” 
?Amend Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 7 to add the 
following subdivision:  “Whenever a nonnamed member of a 
class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 appeals 
a judgment approving a settlement of the class action, the 
district court will require the appellant to file a bond in the 
amount of the expected costs specified in Rule 39(f) unless the 
court finds that (1) appellant raises substantial issues of law 
and does not appeal primarily to obtain a payment for 
withdrawing the appeal and (2) appellant would be financially 
unable to file a bond in that amount.  If the court so finds, the 
court will impose a bond in whatever amount it deems 
necessary to protect the interests of the class, but in no event 
will the bond be less than the costs specified in Rule 39(e) and  
28 U.S.C. § 1920.” 
?Amend Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 to add the 
following subdivision:  “A court of appeals may not hear an 
appeal brought by a nonnamed member of a class certified 
under Federal Rule of Procedure 23 seeking review of a 
judgment approving a settlement of the class action, an order 
under Rule 7 requiring the appellant to file a bond, or the 
amount of such a bond unless the appellant has filed any bond 
required by the district court under Rule 7.” 
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V. CONCLUSION
 The business of professional objectors is to make insubstantial 
objections to class settlements on behalf of nonnamed class members, 
then threaten to appeal the judgment approving the settlement 
unless paid to desist. The business is extortion, and it is profitable 
because class counsel have a powerful incentive to avoid the costs 
that an appeal would impose. Any payment represents a tax on class 
settlements, a tax that is imposed indiscriminately on class 
settlements and burdens the productive use of class litigation. 
 Class settlements, however, can be cozy deals that benefit class 
counsel and defendants at the expense of class members, and 
appellate review can be an important method of protecting the 
interests of the class. The policy objective is to suppress extortionate 
appeals without deterring valuable appeals, and to achieve the result 
at tolerable administrative costs. It is difficult to achieve. Various 
approaches have been tried or proposed, and none is perfect. We 
propose a system under which the district court that approves a 
settlement would presumptively impose an appeal bond requirement 
on nonnamed class member objectors for the full costs of appeal, 
including appellate attorneys’ fees and delay costs, and such an 
appellant would be liable for those costs in the event the appeal fails. 
The presumption could be rebutted and the bond reduced by 
demonstrating to the district court’s satisfaction that the appeal is 
legitimate and that the appellant is financially unable to post the full 
bond. The appellate court would generally be prohibited from 
considering an appeal unless the bond is posted. 
 Our approach is not perfect. It may not suppress all extortionate 
appeals, and it may suppress some legitimate ones. But we believe it 
offers greater promise of maximizing net benefits than any other 
approach. What is abundantly clear is that no method yet 
implemented has squelched this kind of extortion. Professional 
objectors continue to ply their trade. The time is right for a new 
approach, however imperfect.   
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